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Formalism and Realism in Ruins
(Mapping the Logics of Collapse)
PierreSchlag*
ABSTRACT: After laying out a conventional account of the formalism vs.
realism debates, this Article argues that formalism and realism are at once
impossible and entrenched. To say they are impossible is to say that they are
not as represented-thatthey cannot deliver their promised goods. To say
that they are entrenched is to say that these forms of thought are sedimented
as thought and practice throughout law's empire. We live thus amidst the
ruins of formalism and realism. The disputes between these two great
determinations of American law continue today, but usually in more
localized or circumscribed forms. We see versions of the disputes, for
instance, in the stylized disagreements over the desired form of judicial
doctrines (rules vs. standards); or the best rendition of key political values
like equality (formal vs. substantive); or the proper mode of judicial
interpretation(textual vs. purposive). Here too, the arguments that comprise
the localized variants of the dispute remain inconclusive. The Article
concludes by mapping "the logics of collapse--specifically, some critical
moves that undermine the rhetorical and intellectualforce of the formalism
vs. realism disputes and their localized variants. The aims here are several.
First, the ability to deploy the criticalmoves helps with analysis. The critical
moves help show how the arguments are constructed in the first place and
how they are rhetorically and intellectually compromised. Second, and
relatedly, the critical moves allow us to avoid being taken in by the
formalism vs. realism arguments and their localized variants. Third, the
aim is to show how our formalist and realist argumentation has already
been surpassed by a legal "logic" that undermines the cogency of that
argumentation.

I. INTRO DUCTIO N ...............................................................
197

* Byron R. White Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. This paper was
presented at workshops at the University of Colorado Law School, Georgetown University Law
Center, and The University of Tulsa College of Law. I am grateful to the participants for their
comments and criticisms. Thanks as well to Justin Desautels-Stein, Derek Huntley KiernanJohnson, and Ahmed White for their suggestions on an earlier draft.

196

95 IOWA LA W REVIEW

[2009]

II. A CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT: FORMALISM VS. REALISM ......................... 199
A. COMPREHENSIVE FORMALISM ........................................................... 201
B. THE CRITIQUES OFFORMALISM ........................................................ 204

1.
2.
3.
4.
C.
D.

204
205
205
206

REALISM ............................................................
207
THE CRITIQUES OFREALISM ............................................................. 211

1.
2.
3.
4.
E.

Arbitrariness ...........................................................................
Ineffi cacy ................................................................................
Dogm atism .............................................................................
Incoherence ...........................................................................

Structural Vacancy .................................................................
Infidelity to Law .....................................................................
Endless Deferral .....................................................................
Authority Deficits ...................................................................

211
211
211
212

THE RELATIONS OFFORMALISM AM) REALISM ...................................

212

III. THE RUINS-PARADIGMS IMPOSSIBLE AND CRITIQUES INTERRUPTED....213
A. FORMALISM (IMPOSSIBLEAND ENTRENCHED)..................................
214
B. THE CONTINUA TION OFFORMALISM SUB ROSA .................................. 215
C. REALISM (IMPOSSIBLE AND ENTRENCHaD)......................................... 217
D. REALISM FORmAuz D ..................................................
218
E. CRITIQUES INTERRUPT ................................................................. 218
F. STRA TEG ES OFRECONSTRUCTION.................................................... 219
G. SO WHAT? ..........................................................
223

IV. THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE: THE LOCALIZED VARIANTS OF
FORMALISM VS. REALISM ....................................................................... 224
A. RULES vS. STANDARDS ..................................................................... 225
B. VALUE FORMS ........................................................
228
C. TEXTUALISM VS. PURPOSMSM .......................................................... 230
D. SUMMARY ...........................................................
234

V. MAPPING THE LOGICS OF COLLAPSE ...................................................... 234
A.
B.
C.
D.

.

RECURSiVrlY ................................................................................... 236
SHALLOWNESS ........................................................
239
INDIVDUATION ............................................................................... 240
DISPLACEME r ............................................................................... 242
SUMMARY ....................................................................................... 243

VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 244

FORMALISM AND REALISM IN RUINS
I.

INTRODUCTION 1

Of all the great disputes that have marked American law, formalism vs.
realism might well be among the most pervasive and significant. In part, that
is because formalism and realism go to the very form, the very identity, of
American law.
Today, the theoretical version of the struggle between these two grand
visions seems to be dormant. But everywhere, we see residual skirmishes.
Everywhere, we notice "localized variants" of the epic struggles: rules vs.
standards, textualism vs. purposivism, substantive values vs. formal values
(and more). 2 And as we move from one local "substantive" field to another,
we encounter, over and over again, the same argumentative forms: The
precise semantics may change, but the grammar remains the same. We
encounter roughly the same formalism vs. realism dispute on any substantive
terrain: freedom
of speech, 3 jurisprudence, 4 federalism, 5 legal
6
interpretation, statutory interpretation, 7 the takings clause, 8 whatever.
1. This is a continuation of an effort to develop a jurisprudence of form. For other
installments, see Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1047 (2002)
[hereinafter Schlag, Aesthetics]; Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the
Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929 (1988); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 379 (1985) [hereinafter Schlag, Rules and Standards]. See also Pierre Schlag, The
Dedifferentiation Problem, 41 CONTINENTAL PHIL. REV. 35 (2009) [hereinafter Schlag,
Dedifferentiation].
2. See infra Part IV (elaborating the localized variants of formalism vs. realism).
3. Compare Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson,
51 CAL. L. REv. 729, 732 (1963) (arguing that courts should not use balancing in all First
Amendment cases, but should try to fashion a rule or principle), and Laurent B. Frantz, The First
Amendment in the Balance,71 YALELJ. 1424, 1425 (1962) (same), with Wallace Mendelson, On the
Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821, 823-25 (1962)
(arguing from the text and history of the Constitution that the court should use balancing in
First Amendment cases), and Wallace Mendelson, The First Amendment and the JudicialProcess: A
Reply to Mr. Frantz,17 VAND. L. REV. 479, 481-83 (1964) (same).
4. See infra Part II (critiquing formalism and realism).
5. Compare Allison H. Eid, Federalism and Formalism, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1191,
1195 (2003) ("[A] dose of formalism is necessary to adequately protect the values of
federalism."), with Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and Functionalismin FederalismAnalysis, 13 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 959,960 (1997) ("[A] formalistic approach to federalism is misguided.").
6. Compare ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW, at vii (1997) ("Laws mean what they actually say, not what legislators intended them to
say."), with RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 470 (1985) (concluding that law is an attitude that
must be pervasive in ordinary lives "if it is to serve us well even in court").
7.
Compare William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479, 1479 (1987) ("Statutes, however, should-like the Constitution and the common law-be
interpreted 'dynamically,' that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal context."),
withJohn F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine,97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 675 (1997)
("[T]extualism functions to preserve the integrity of the legislative process by stripping
congressional agents of the authority to resolve vague and ambiguous texts of Congress's own
making."), and John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 685, 708 (1999) ("The current academic consensus against textualism rests upon the
shakiest of empirical foundations.").
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Everywhere, the debates are as intense and intricate as they are infirm
and inconclusive. And everywhere, it seems, we encounter reasonably wellintentioned people-people like me (and now people like you)-drawn to
these disputes like moths to a flame.
Why-why do we do this? At some level, we know that formalism and
realism are in disrepair and yet, when someone launches a rules vs.
standards dispute, we show up to take sides. The same goes for the
interpretive variant of the dispute-textualism vs. purposivism. Same goes
for value-form definitions-formal or substantive. We are taken in as if by
some wondrous or infernal machine.
How did we get here? This will be Part II-where I describe formalism
and realism as two great, formal determinations of American law. I will also
present their respective standard critiques. The aim of this section is to map
out the positions, the rhetoric, and the stakes in a way that will enable us to
recognize in this Article (and elsewhere) the presence of a variety of
formalism vs. realism disputes-the localized variants.
In Part III, I then show that formalism and realism are at once
impossible and entrenched. To say they are impossible is to say that they are
not as represented-that they cannot deliver their promised goods. To say
that they are entrenched is to say that these forms of thought are
sedimented as thought and practice throughout law's empire. It is also to say
that the critiques, whatever their conceptual merit, have been insufficient to
displace the formalism vs. realism disputes.
We live thus amidst the ruins of formalism and realism. The disputes
continue, but in more localized or circumscribed forms. In Part IV, I discuss
versions of the disputes in the stylized disagreements over the desired form
of judicial doctrines (rules vs. standards), the best rendition of key political
values like equality (formal vs. substantive), and the proper mode of judicial
interpretation (textual vs. purposive). Here too the arguments that comprise
the localized variants of the dispute remain inconclusive. And as for the
many efforts dedicated to resolving the disputes-they not only fail at
resolution, but ironically succeed in heightening pluralization (hence
further heightening the aura of irresolution).
What are we to think, to do? In Part V, I will map the logics of
collapse-specifically, some critical moves that undermine the rhetorical
force of the formalism vs. realism disputes and their variants. The aims here
are several. First, at a basic level, the ability to activate the critical moves
helps with analysis-there is no point buying into pro-formalism or prorealism arguments if they are compromised. The critical moves help show

8. For a dispute between takings formalism vs. takings realism, compare Richard A.
Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479 (1995), with Mark
Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatoiy Formulas:Exaction and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 609 (2004).

FORMALISM AND REALISM IN RUINS

how the arguments are constructed in the first place and how they are
intellectually compromised. Second, and relatedly, the critical moves allow
us to avoid being taken in by the formalism vs. realism arguments and their
localized variants. The idea is to regain a bit of our agency (we law-types) as
we deal with compromised arguments that nonetheless continue to shape
the way we think. The idea is to show how we can get beyond the
automaticity of these legal arguments. Third, the aim is to show how our
formalist and realist argumentation has already been surpassed by a legal
"logic" that undermines the cogency of that argumentation.
II. A CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT: FORMALISM VS. REALISM
In American law, there is a conventional story told about formalism and
its collapse. As this story is told over and over again, objections to its
historical veracity accumulate. 9 But while the question of veracity clearly
matters (very much so), so does the facticity of the conventional story. True
or not, the story has had considerable effect on the way we have come to
think of our own law. Although there are variations to the story, generally it
goes something as follows:
At the end of the nineteenth century, legal thought in American law
schools was dominated by a theoretically unarticulated, though
institutionally settled, view of law. According to this view-one tacitly
instantiated in treatises and law-review articles-law was a coherent, gapless,
autonomous, and comprehensive system of conceptual propositions. This
view of law-described by Thomas Grey as "comprehensive" formalismcame under withering critique from the legal realists in the 1920s and
1930s.10
Once the work of critique was completed, comprehensive formalism was
displaced, at least in part, by a working approach to law-call it "realism"that insisted on its instrumental, practical, contextual, constructed, and
adaptive character. 11 This tacit working approach-conceived in embryonic
9. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of the Tormalist'Age 2 (St. John's Legal Studies
Research Paper, Working Paper No. 06-0073, 2007), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=985083# (critiquing the standard account of the formalist era).
10. Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism 2 (Stanford Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Series,
Working Paper No. 4, 1999), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
200732 [hereinafter Grey, The New Formalism]; see also Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45
U. PIrr. L. REV. 1, 33-39 (1983) [hereinafter Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy] (discussing the
progression of formalism through time).
11. Nomenclature is always a dicey thing. My hope is that my description here will be
recognizable to the reader as a contemporary and commonplace working approach in
American law and that the label "realism" evokes its character. Realism, as described here, has
some relation to the positive theories of law advanced by some of the legal realists. But what is
most important to this paper is that realism be recognizable as a working approach to law used
by many contemporaryjurists and legal thinkers in their processing of the legal materials.
That being said, the realism I describe here tracks very roughly with Robert Summers's
account of "pragmatic instrumentalism"-a helpful theorization of the positive vision of law
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form by some of the legal realists-has been in place for most of the
twentieth century. It has co-existed side by side with the residues of
comprehensive formalism.
As intellectual history, the conventional story likely suffers from certain
weaknesses. The story is too simple; the temporal ordering is far too neat
and unidirectional; the myths of origins loom too large and the narrative
(like much legal thought) is too steeped in a philosophical idealism. But
even so, this conventional story has been influential across generations of
American legal thinkers. It has been told many times. The story has thus
influenced what legal thinkers identify and recognize as formalism and
realism as well as their characteristic virtues and vices.
Here, with but one significant exception, I try to stick as closely as
possible to the conventional story.12 Accordingly, I make no strong claims
here for the accuracy of what actual historical actors labeled as legal
formalists or legal realists "really" believed. 13 I do make two claims. One is to
describe an important conventional story about the development of
American law-a story still very much in circulation and still of constitutive
import for contemporary legal consciousness. I also claim that the modes of
thought described here as formalism and realism are recognizable in more
or less adulterated/attenuated forms in the consciousness of contemporary
jurists and legal thinkers. 14
championed by many legal realists and sociological jurisprudes at the beginning of the
twentieth century. See generally ROBERT SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL
THEORY (1982); Robert S. Summers, PragmaticInstrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal

Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66
CORNELL L. REv. 861 (1981) [hereinafter Summers, PragmaticInstrumentalism].

12. The exception is that I do not portray formalism and realism as symmetrical
alternatives. See infra Part II.C (introducing realism as something other than a mirror image of
formalism).
13. With regard to formalism, the historical veracity of the story is particularly
questionable. As David Lyons cautions, "Legal formalism is difficult to define because, so far as I
can tell, no one ever developed and defended a systematic body of doctrines that would answer
to that name. We have no clear notion of what underlying philosophical ideas might motivate
its conception of the law." David Lyons, LegalFormalismand Instrumentalism-A PathologicalStudy,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 949, 950 (1981). Indeed, not only do we confront the problem of the
missing referent here (i.e., who or what are we talking about?), but there is the very serious
question of whether the ostensible referent was as important or prevalent as the story claims.
14. Consider, for instance, these different stylizations of formalism vs. realism (or their
analogues) in different precincts of law's empire:
Opinion Writing: The Formal Style and the Grand Style: The "grand style" and the "formal

style" are two styles of judicial opinion writing which Llewellyn describes as corresponding to
the antebellum period and the end of the 19th century respectively. In the grand style,
precedent is considered in light of the reputation of the judge and principle is treated as a
source of sense, order, and policy. In the formal style, by contrast, rules decide the cases, policy
is left to the legislature, and principle is used to cull errant precedent. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 36-38 (1960).

Moral Reasoning: Immanent Moral Rationality vs. Instrumentalism. See generally Ernest J.
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L. J. 949 (1988)

FORMALISM AND REALISM IN RUINS
A.

COMPREHENSIVEFORMALISM

Comprehensive formalism presents as a complete vision of law-a
contender for what law, broadly understood, is and ought to be. A number
6
5
of thinkers, including most prominently Ernest Weinrib, 1 David Lyons, '
Thomas C. Grey,17 Paul Cox, 18 Duncan Kennedy, 19 and Lawrence B.
Solum, 20 have described many aspects of comprehensive formalism. Though
these thinkers do not always offer the same description, or target the same
object of inquiry, there is nonetheless a fair degree of overlap in the various
descriptions. Here it is important to recognize that, like so much else in law,
formalism remains, itself, incompletely formalized. Not only is there no
single agreed-upon conceptualization of formalism, but the several existing
conceptualizations are themselves not fully specified. Indeed, some

(contrasting a formalist vision of law as an intelligible immanent order with an instrumentalist
vision of law as aimed at achieving external ends).
Globalizations: Classical Legal Thought vs. the Social. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Three
Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2006) (contrasting "classical legal thought" as a mode of thought preoccupied with
maintaining spheres of autonomy for public and private actors with "the social" as a mode of
thought preoccupied with purposive uses of law as a regulatory mechanism).
Legal Theory: Grand Theory vs. Pragmatism. Compare DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY (2002) (deriding "grand theory"), with Robert Bork, Neutral
Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (radicalizing Wechsler's Neutral
Principlesapproach to constitutional adjudication).
Internal Architecture of Law: Systematicity and Consequences. Compare Jeremy Waldron,
"Transcendental Nonsense" and System in the Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 47-52 (2000) (arguing
that "systematicity"-the conceptual terminology and coherence of law-is necessary and
should "accommodate" policy initiatives), with Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory andJudicialLogic, 59
YALE L.J. 238, 241 (1950) [hereinafter Cohen, Field Theory] (advocating a global-consequentialist
form of reasoning).
Legal Virtues: Rule of Law and Instrumentalism. See generally Tamanaha, supra note 9
(delineating rule of law and instrumentalist modes of law and legal thought).
15. Weinrib, supra note 14, at 961-62.
16. Lyons, supra note 13, at 950-52.
17. Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473

(2003).
18. Paul Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial)Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 IND. L. REV. 57
(2003).
19. Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understandingof Legal Consciousness: The Case of
ClassicalLegal Thought America, 1850-1940, 3 RES. L. & SOc. 3 (1980). Kennedy does not theorize
a construct called "formalism," but rather, one called "classical legal thought." Id. This is not
just a matter of different nomenclature. Kennedy's construct traverses any ostensible
form/substance divide, whereas those who theorize "formalism" (myself included) are focusing
very much on something they (we) call form. The difference is important, but there is clearly
overlap between the two approaches.
20. Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 475
(2004-2005).
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conceptualizations of formalism are (and this is not intended as a criticism)
downright impressionistic. 21
Typically, formalism (and here I cull from the theorists mentioned
above) represents law in terms of a number of related traits-specifically
conceptualism, coherence, gaplessness, autonomy, and comprehensiveness.
Below, I describe these traits briefly and indicate in italics the sort of
theoretical commitments that they rule out.
Conceptualism: Law contains concepts (e.g., "property") that are
sufficiently rich and determinate to allow a "meaning-based" elaboration of
the system of law.22 In other words, one can reflect upon the concepts of law
in such a way as to derive legal conclusions from those concepts (without any
extrinsic aid). 23
This rules out the view of law in instrumental, consequential, or policy

terms. Conceptualism renders any examination of social/economic/political
effects of law irrelevant to proper legal decision making. Ad hoc policy
analysis, efficiency logarithms, and utilitarian calculations are all ruled
out. Indeed, any considerationof the effects of the law as a basisfor decision
making is viewed, at the very least, as suspect, if not totally illegitimate.
Coherence/Systematicity:Law as a system hangs together. 24 In other words,

the system of law is (generally and ideally) free from discursive
embarrassments such as disjuncture, contradiction, ambiguity, overlapping
distinctions, ad hocery, and the like.
Ruled out here are particularist,pluralistic, and catachrestic accounts of
law and views of law as importantly context-dependent.
Gaplessness: The law addresses and provides an answer for each and
every legal issue that might arise. There are no "holes" in the law-and thus
no occasion for any court to seek or construct some extra-legal source of
decision making. 25 Gaplessness, together with coherence, is also conducive

21.
22.

See generally id.
The "meaning-based" term is offered by Duncan Kennedy. Duncan Kennedy, Legal

Formalism, in 13 THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

8634, 8635-36 (2001). Kennedy's term is helpful because it captures the ethos so well: the
attempt to derive meaning from basic concepts alone, in isolation from history, psychology,
politics, and culture. See also Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, supra note 10, at 12 ("[O]ne could derive
the rules themselves analytically from the principles.").
23. Weinrib, supra note 14, at 961-62.
24. See Summers, PragmaticInstrumentalism, supra note 11, at 890 ("Consistency, analogy,
coherence, harmony, and symmetry were their main tests of soundness.").
25. See Grey, LangdeUt's Orthodoxy, supra note 10, at 12 ("It was crucial to the completeness
of the system that it be conceptually ordered, and that its fundamental principles and their
constitutive concepts be sufficiently abstract to cover the whole range of possible cases.");
Lyons, supra note 13, at 950 ("The law provides sufficient basis for deciding any case that arises.
There are no gaps within the law, and there is but one sound legal decision for each case."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

FORMALISM AND REALISM IN RUINS

to the idea that for every legal question, there is a right answer and that law
is objective.
Gaplessness rules out the notion that law can be invented or created. Since
law is gapless, there is never any need for a court to invent or create law.
Indeed, for a court to create law would be itself a lawless act.
Autonomy: Law develops according to its own internal logic. Law's
intellectual credentials stand on their own and are in need of no further
support from other disciplines such as economics or sociology. 26 It is
possible, of course, to have economic, sociological, or other understandings
of law. However, these are neither necessary nor sufficient to actually
understand law or to say what it is.
Autonomy rules out the notion that we must or can resort to extra- or transdisciplinary knowledge or moral/politicalprinciples in order to understand
law or to say what it is or should be.
Comprehensiveness/Completeness:Not only is law gapless (no gaps within its
interior regions), but law occupies only the field properly subject to law. 27
The idea here is that there are given limits to law and juridificationshould
not exceed those limits. Ruled out is the notion that law can be extended to
matters that are not already subject to law.
Formalist theories of law will usually affirm all or a combination of these
claims. Obviously, increased relaxation or rejection of each trait will tend to
make the theory seem increasingly less deserving of the name "formalist."
In its purest form, comprehensive formalism is advanced as both a
descriptive and a normative theory of law. The link between the two is
furnished by an insistence on fidelity to law (specifically, the formalist
version of law). 28 Comprehensive formalism brooks no compromise. If

26.
Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, supra note 10, at 6 ("Classical orthodoxy was a particular
kind of legal theory-a set of ideas to be put to work from inside by those who operate legal
institutions, not a set of ideas about those institutions reflecting an outside perspective, whether

a sociological, historical or economic explanation of legal phenomena.").
27. Id. at 11. Grey stated:
When a new case arose to which no existing rule applied, it could be categorized
and the correct rule for it could be inferred by use of the general concepts and
principles; the rule could then be applied to the facts to dictate the unique correct
decision in the case.
Id.
28. There are, of course, all sorts of difficulties facing formalists about what to do when
the declared positive law itself fails to conform to the legal formalist ideal. The question is:
Should such non-conforming law be followed in the name of fidelity to a formalist process, or
should it instead be rejected in the name of inconsistency with formalist form?
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comprehensive formalism seems dogmatic or unearthly, so be it. The idea is
that law is law and the world must adapt to it, not the other way around. 29
B.

THE CRITIQUES OFFORMALISM

During most of the twentieth century, comprehensive formalism was
roundly dismissed in the American legal academy-indeed, to the point of
being simply ignored. Today, one would be hard put to find more than a
small group of legal thinkers committed to comprehensive formalism. This
is not to say, however, that formalism has been expunged from the juridical
scene. Formalism remains and even thrives in various corners of law's
empire, even as its full-blown theoretical expression has been decisively
rejected.
The intellectual destruction of comprehensive formalism is generally
credited to the legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s. The analytical lines of
attack were generally infrastructural in character. That is to say, the legal
realists generally tried to crack legal formalism at certain weak points rather
than theorizing it from some overarching standpoint.3 0 Ridicule and
sarcasm were the prevalent rhetorical instruments-incredulity and outrage
the underlying tone. Comprehensive formalism foundered, not so much the
victim of philosophical death blows, but rather from a thousand cuts of
31
jurisprudential embarrassment.
1.

Arbitrariness

One of the most enduring realist critiques was a switch in the field of
application. While the formalists could be content to "get their law right" in
the books and let the world adjust, the realists claimed that law should take
32
into account and respond to the imperatives of social and economic life.
The test of sound law was no longer confined to observance of the formalist
virtues. Instead, law had to answer for how well or how poorly it regulated
social and economic life. For comprehensive formalism, that kind of switch
in the field of application was not a cheerful prospect. Not only would law
have to surrender its vaunted autonomy, but perhaps worse, law would have
to follow the configurations and demands of social and economic liferealms unlikely to be governed by an invariant, overarching, and coherent

29. Cf Cox, supra note 18, at 92-94 (describing formalism as rejecting responsiveness to
"social need").
30. Thurman Arnold's major opus is perhaps the most obvious exception. THURMAN W.
ARNOLD, SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935).
31. As Morton Horwitz put it, legal realism was "more an intellectual mood than a clear
body of tenets." MORTON HORwrTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169 (1992).

32. Cohen, Field Theory, supra note 14, at 251 ("[W]e can reject the old idea of straight
lines of precedent filling absolute legal space.").
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logic. As a consequence,
arbitrariness.

formalism
2.

would

lead

to nonsense

and

Inefficacy

For comprehensive formalists, the origin of law lies in its conceptual
ordering. This means, among other things, that when courts depart from
this conceptual order, they are in a profound sense not doing law at all. The
realists turned this view on its head. Jerome Frank, for instance, poured
scorn on what he called "formal law" and "law in discourse"-arguing that it
is what courts do, in fact, that is law. 33 Adverting to Holmes's "bad man" and
the related prediction theory of law, Frank pointed out that the "bad man"
doesn't care about the scholarly elaborations of formalist legal science. 34 He
cares only for the consequences that a court will visit upon him. Again, this
was not so much a refutation of formalism as a displacement-in this case a
displacement of the source of law from concepts to courts. 35 And not courts
in general, but named, specific, socially situated courts. With this
displacement of the sources of law, comprehensive formalism would be
incapable of realizing (making real) its ostensible virtues.
3.

Dogmatism

While the formalists saw law as a set of "rules, doctrines, and
principles"-in short, a set of propositions-the realists sought to reacquaint
law with its social character. This meant not merely that those who shape law
should consider its social consequences, but something far more radical. For
many of the realists, law itself (law's identity) had a social dimension crucial
to its proper elaboration. Llewellyn, for instance, rejected the image of law
as a system of propositions and instead sought to treat law as "a doing"-an
activity. 3 6 Felix Cohen, who described legal formalism as a kind of
"transcendental nonsense," 37 conceived of judicial decisions as social events
to be understood in terms of social antecedents and consequents. 38 And in
the instrumentalism common to many thinkers of that era-Cohen, Pound,
39
Holmes, etc.-law was viewed and wielded as a tool.

33. See generally Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 645 (1932)
(explaining that what courts do depends, not so much on "facts," but on what various actors,

such as judges, juries, and witnesses, believe the facts to be).
34. Id. at 645.
35. Id.
36. Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
651,668 (1935) (describing law as "a doing").
37. Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809,809 (1935) [hereinafter Cohen, FunctionalApproach].

38.

Id. at 834.

39.

Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the CulturalStudy of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53

BUFF. L. REv. 973, 980 (2005) (noting that "the principal insight of Realism was that law was
best imagined metaphorically as a tool").
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Once one accepts that law is a doing, an event, a tool, and a medium of
social action, formalism becomes a much more daunting, if not impossible,
project. The reason is simple: One might, as a formalist, plausibly assert the
presence of some sort of conceptual order to law if it is a system of
propositions organized according to logic. In this case, one can rely on the
assumption that the conceptual meaning of a rule or a doctrine determines
its identity (and its proper scope of application). But if the identity of a rule
or a doctrine is its social use, then the claim that its conceptual meaning
determines its identity becomes a kind of dogmatism-and moreover, an
implausible dogmatism. It is implausible because there is absolutely no
reason to believe in the coincidence between conceptual meaning and social
use-particularly not in a politically and financially stressed setting such as
litigation.
4.

Incoherence

Another form of critique launched against formalism was the collapse
of conceptual oppositions through frame shifting. Here, Robert Hale and
his predecessor, Wesley Hohfeld, are key figures. 40 Hale argued that the
grant of a property right to a private party effectively disabled other parties
from using the protected resource. 41 Accordingly, every grant of a private
right was also a disablement of the rights of others. One implication is that a
grant of a legal right did not necessarily increase liberty-it merely increased
someone's liberty by coercively impairing someone else's. 42 The implication
for Hale is that the decision of how to distribute legal entitlements could not
be deduced from the elaboration of broad-scale legal concepts such as
4
"liberty" or "rights" or their analogues. 3
Hale's specific arguments were considerably more sophisticated and
subversive than this brief summary intimates. 44 But what is important here is
the generalizable form of his critique. If social or economic life is indeed so
relentlessly conflictual and law is both an introjection and a progenitor of
this conflict, then legal conclusions about how to define entitlements
derived from the elaboration of broad-scale legal concepts or legal
distinctions are suspect. They are particularly suspect-indeed,

40.

Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 POL. SCl. Q.

470 (1923); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning,23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). Hohfeld is not generally identified as a realist, but rather as

an important precursor.
41. Hale, supra note 40, at 471.
42. See id. at 489 ("Frequently it may be true that to preserve one value ... it may be
necessary to curtail another .... ").
43. See id. (stating that it would be "impossible" to protect all "rights ... against shrinkage
of value").
44. For elaboration, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, SExY DRESSING,
(comparing Hale to Foucault).

ETC.

83-125

(1995)
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incoherent-if one looks at only one side of the equation and only one side
of the dispute.
These epistemic shortcomings were given normative bite. Not only did
formalism yield "transcendental nonsense" in Felix Cohen's memorable
phrase, but it short-circuited the kinds of ethical and political inquiries that
realists believed judges should undertake. 45 Courts reached decisions by
bypassing what many realists took to be essential-namely, the social and
economic consequences.
Most of the critiques of formalism are based on these characterizations.
To its critics, formalism seems to be detached from both normative and
political values as well as the ostensible realities in the social and economic
sphere. Accordingly, formalism is routinely described as mechanical,
wooden, rigid, authoritarian, and generally out of touch.
C. REALISM
Before proceeding with the exploration of realism, a caveat is necessary.
In discussions of formalism and realism (or their analogues), commentators
often present them symmetrically as competitors playing on the same field.
The story here is slightly different: Comprehensive formalism and realism, as
presented here, play for different stakes, and they aspire to different ends. If
we must use the ludic metaphor, it would be more appropriate to say that
formalists and realists want to play different games on different fields.
We should not simply assume that formalism and realism are mirror
inverse images of each other. They are not. The differences are telling.
Formalism and realism hold different views of the world in which they
operate and of their own possibilities for law. Having these different
pictures, they occupy different roles. Hence:
Comprehensive Formalism
isa
Pure
Ideal
Comprehensive
First-best
Model
of law

Realism
is a
Compromised
Worldly
Partial
Second-best
Approach
to law

In American law, realism emerged in embryonic form in some of the
legal realist writings of the 1920s and 1930s. 46 It has remained, along with
the residues of formalism, an enduring tacit understanding of law
throughout the twentieth century. One sees elements of realism in the legal

45. See generally Cohen, Functional Approach, supra note 37 (introducing the concept of
.transcendental nonsense").
46. Summers, PragmaticInstrumentalisr, supra note 11, at 864 n.2.

95 IOWA LA WREVIEW

[2009]

process school (e.g., reasoned elaboration), law and economics (e.g.,
instrumentalism), critical thought (e.g., contextualism), and, of course, the
neo-pragmatism of the 1990s (e.g., practicality).
As with comprehensive formalism, realism is composed of a series of
traits that seem to cohere-to hang together. In sharp contrast to formalism,
however, one cannot speak of comprehensive realism. On the contrary,
realism is necessarily parasitic on a pre-existing architecture (which in the
American context happens to be formalist). Typically, realism coheres
around the following traits: instrumentalism, practicality, contextualism,
constructionism, and adaptability. Below, I describe these traits briefly and
indicate in italics the sort of theoretical commitments that they rule out.
Instrumentalism: As against the conceptualist entailments of formalism,
we have the means/ends logic of what is variously called instrumentalism,
consequentialism, functionalism, purposive reasoning, policy analysis, or
politics. Law is a means to an end. Ends are objectives to be realized (made
real) in the social, economic, or political sphere. 47 Law, in short, is on a
mission. Actually, a variety of missions: economic efficiency, utility
maximization, progressive legal change, ad hoc policy goals, and more. A
law is redeemed or not by virtue of its success in realizing its objective
(without producing too much in the way of unintended consequences
elsewhere).
Ruled out here is the possibility of treating law as an end in itself-as an
expression of communal aspirations and values through which the
community constitutes and comes to know itself Ruled out as well is the
notion that law must follow its own principles of right action (except to the
extent that these arejustified instrumentally).
Practicality:Law must be tailored to its specific domain, its regulatory
objects, and its personnel. What matters is that laws be tailored to the social,
economic, and political domains to which they apply. In its more recent and
sophisticated versions, practicality involves a repertoire of concepts that help
describe the interactions of law and its field of applications-notions such as
feedback loops, tipping, indivisibilities, perverse effects, and the like. In its
less sophisticated versions, practicality means common sense and sound
situational judgments.
Ruled out here is the possibility of an elegant and systematic account of the
coherence of law except at the highest level of abstraction (e.g., efficiency or
utilitariananalysis).

47. This is the view of law aptly theorized by Robert Summers. See generally id. (exploring
pragmatic instrumentalism).
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Contextualism: The appropriateness of any law (or of law at all) is a
function of its various contexts. 48 Accordingly, whether some class of people
should be regulated and how, if at all, depends upon the relevant contexts.
In turn, the meaning of a law depends upon the context in which it is issued,
analyzed, and applied. In its sophisticated versions, contextualism entails a
post-Hohfeld, post-Hale, post-Coase view that understands that for every
entitlement created in one kind of activity or party, there is a corresponding
49
encumbrance imposed on some other kind of activity or party.
Ruled out here are brute notions that laws have discrete and stable identities
apartfrom their various contexts. Likewise excluded is the view that law is,
in some nontrivial sense, objective. Likewise ruled out is the right-answer
thesis.
Constructionism: Law is a social and intellectual construction. Law is, in
important ways, a creation of evolving social norms and conventional
practice. Law is, in important ways, derived from or constituted by forces
external to law such as market forces, linguistic patterns, cognitive habits,
cultural norms, political contestation ... and law in turn constitutes them.
(The relations can be described in more or less complex ways.) 50 The
credentials of law-its normative appeal and intellectual validity-will
depend upon redemption from fields other than law: economics, moral
philosophy, sociology, etc. In the legal academy, the dependency of law is
increasingly recognized by the professionalization of personnel (PhDs
required) and inter- or trans-disciplinary study.
Ruled out here is the notion of a discrete logic (a form of reasoning or
interpretation) specific to law. Ruled out also is the notion that law has
descriptively or normatively a distinct empire. Law is simply one form of
coordination or governance among, and in competition with, others.
Adaptability: Realism presents law as essentially pliable. Realism offers
some understanding of the contingency of human and legal arrangementsthe sense that "things could be otherwise." In principle, for realists, every
aspect of life is subject to juridification. In part, this is because law is not
subject to strong formal determinations-it is pliable. 5 1 And in part, this is

48. Id. at 864 (describing realism as stressing "time, place, circumstance, and particular
wants and interests rather than ideology, abstract theory, principle, and an a priori normative
view of the nature of things" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
49. All three insist upon the conflictual character of entitlement creation. Ronald Coase,
TheProblem ofSocial Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Hale, supra note 40; Hohfeld, supra note 40.
50. For a sustained elaboration, see generally Schlag, Dedifferentiation,supra note 1.
51.
See Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 11, at 922 (describing some legal
realists as advancing the view of law as highly malleable).
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because of the instrumentalist orientation-which, in the absence of a
52
confining structure, knows no bounds.
Ruled out here is the notion that there is a timeless or transcontextual
essence to law.
Upon
linking
all
these
traits-instrumentalism,
practicality,
contextualism, constructionism, and adaptability-several things become
apparent.
First, just as with comprehensive formalism, there is a sense in which the
various traits of realism hang together. One can see that a commitment to
some of these traits could easily lead aesthetically to a commitment to the
other traits.
Second, if one views all these traits together, they seem to describe a
recognizable and widespread view of law. In other words, realism as
presented here is not simply a model for thinking about law, but one that we
see in action in various juridical and legal-academic precincts. This is very
much unlike comprehensive formalism, which is a pure form that one
seldom finds faithfully instanced in anyone's work. There are several reasons
for this-but one needs to be noted here in particular. The comprehensive
formalist is a "law utopian"-someone who believes that the ideal of law (to
wit: the formalist ideal) must be followed come what may. He is an
absolutist. A realist, by contrast, is someone who understands that law is
always in negotiation with the world. Law is thus nearly always a second-best
enterprise operating in a second-best world. The realist vision already
incorporates notions of trade-offs and compromises. The result is that
realism is much more common than comprehensive formalism in the actioncontexts of the law (e.g., lawyering). There is an odd sense in which realism
does not need to compromise its vision of the law in action-contexts: Realism
already is that compromise. To the extent we see comprehensive formalism
in action, by contrast, it is only in interstitial ritualized moments-generally
far removed from action-contexts.
Third, and this is very important, realism is not a complete selfsustaining account of law. It is instead, as mentioned before, a protestant
tradition. It is parasitic on a pre-existing architecture of law. Realism is thus
already rhetorically indebted to formalism. A total triumph over formalism
would be disastrous for realism as well.

52. One should not underestimate the extent to which the appeal of realism among legal
scholars can be ascribed to parochial or guild self-interest. There is no doubt that realism
authorizes the expansion of scholarly agendas, particularly relative to the austere scholarly
economics of formalism. See generally Pierre Schlag, Spare Juisprudence,Air Law, and the Rank
Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803 (2009) (discussing
the state of contemporary legal scholarship).
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D. THE CRITIQUES OFREALISM
In contrast to formalism, realism is not highly structured. On the
contrary, it claims to be a denial/rejection of the rigidly structured and
conceptualized world of formalism. Not surprisingly, the most popular
critiques of realism tend to exhibit the same traits as their target-a kind of
structural underspecification. The critiques of realism are not for that
reason any less passionate or convincing.
1.

Structural Vacancy

Viewed critically, realism is characterized by a certain jurisprudential
permissiveness and a kind of structural vacancy. If compromise between the
law and the world, concept and practice is itself part of the "structure" of
realism, then there is a great deal of give and play at its very heart. Realism
makes no offer it is not willing to negotiate.
2.

Infidelity to Law

For critics, realism can easily seem strikingly antithetical (at least in its
consequentialist and contextualist aspects) to the rule of law.53 Indeed, one
could go through Lon Fuller's description of the rule-of-law virtuesrequirements such as notice, publicity, the prohibition on ex post facto
laws-and argue that the realist vision of law arguably violates nearly all of
54

them.
In realism, it is not law that rules. On the contrary, constructionism
implies that law is not (always) the authoritative source for the legal
decisions rendered. Instead, law is (at least sometimes) derivative of social
forces, political contests, market behavior, the plurality of utils, or the
economy. There is at the very least a great deal of traffic between law and
the social-involving feedback loops, reciprocal causation, and so on. Law,
to put it in brute terms, is not entirely in charge here.
3.

Endless Deferral

In virtue of its structural vacancy, its distrust of unreflective formalism,
and its celebration of contextualism and practice, realism effectively delays
and defers choice to some future decision or decision maker. Realism has
very little to say a priori other than to be wary of a prioris. The upshot, and

53. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 227-45 (2006) (exploring
consequentialism as corrosive of the rule of law).
54. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALIT OF LAW (1969) (discussing how morality
counteracts the typical failures associated with making law). There are, of course, available
responses. One of them is that the rule-of-law virtues-notice, publicity, etc.-are satisfied
because citizens already know that the legal regime is instrumentalist and adaptive. This answer,
without more, seems a bit formulaic. A variant would be the idea that realism effectively defers
to social and economic norms that are well-known to the citizenry (occasionally better-known
than the law itself).
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there is irony here, is that this form of thought, which wants to be practical,
perpetually avoids making hard decisions. 55 Much of what realism has to
teach us about making decisions is a counsel to wait, to postpone, to eschew,
to avoid the moment of decision. It seems there is always a future that is
more specific, more contextualized, and less formal in which to render a
decision. And when a decision is rendered, realism tells us it can be
revisited, revised, and reformed.
4.

Authority Deficits

Not only does realism preclude law from ruling, as suggested above, but
realism does not (and cannot) put itself in the place of law. It is not a
complete theory of law. It is neither complete nor a theory. Some thinkers
celebrate realism precisely because it abjures completeness and theory
status. Indeed, arguably, those are key virtues of realism. At the same time,
these virtues, in the context of law, can be viewed as vices. Realism is always
busy deferring to other sources of authority: politics, social norms, economic
56
forces, and so on.
E.

THE RELATIONS OFFORMALISM AND REALISM

As previously mentioned, comprehensive formalism and realism do not
stand on the same footing or claim the same role for themselves.
Comprehensive formalism can present as a stand-alone theory (although the
production of outcomes may require "cheating"). Realism, by contrast,
depends upon a pre-existing legal architecture (which can only be
maintained by realists if they think and act in very non-realist ways).
Comprehensive formalism requires "cheating" in the sense that the
formal rules cannot all be deduced or derived from law, but must be based
upon some non-juridical understanding of social and economic practices.
Where comprehensive formalism fails to incorporate such social
understandings, it yields results that are demonstrably silly (which is what
many of the legal realists repeatedly tried to show).
Realism meanwhile depends on some pre-existing architecture of legal
concepts. It can, of course, justify the creation of such concepts and can
possibly even generate such concepts. But it will need to get this architecture
by borrowing from elsewhere: Instrumentalism gives us neither ends nor
starting points. 57 Practicality says nothing about what to be practical with or

55. Without a heady shot of existentialist commitment, it is hard to see how the realist
could ever make up his mind.

56. Indeed, Thomas Grey rightfully suggests, in a slightly different context, that
pragmatism provides a respectable intellectual stance that reprieves the need to "have a theory."
Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens andPragmatistLegal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1569, 1569 (1990). As he puts it, "Pragmatism is freedom from theory-guilt." Id.
57. As Summers painstakingly demonstrates, one cannot do means-ends analysis in a
vacuum: One has to have an architecture in place delineating identities and institutional
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about. Contextualism cannot select the relevant text. Constructionism is
devoid of imperatives and normative values. And as for adaptation ... the
question is adaptation to what? Moreover, realism cannot (absent the
importation of some very non-realist modes of thought) process legal
concepts in the automatic, unreflective, non-instrumentalist way necessary to
sustain the architecture.
Both comprehensive formalism and realism will fault the other for
being the kind of jurisprudence it is in fact trying to be. To the realist, a
comprehensive model of any kind (formalist or not) is inappropriate. It is
already (formalist or not) a misapprehension of how the world works and of
the possibilities of law. Meanwhile, to the formalist, something that calls
itself a mere "approach" and that admits its compromised character
misunderstands the nature of law itself and perforce the role of law in the
world.
The different identity-positions of comprehensive formalism and
realism help explain their particular weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Virtually
no one these days believes in the possibility of a coherent global model of
law. This renders comprehensive formalism simply unbelievable except in
some much chastened or selective form. Meanwhile, the fact that realism is
both partial and merely an approach means that it is not in charge of its own
destiny. Realism can never be pure and is always susceptible to colonization
by some formalism upon which it ironically depends.

III. THE RUINS-PARADIGMS IMPOSSIBLE AND CRITIQUES INTERRUPTED
Contemporary
legal
consciousness
confronts
an
interesting
predicament. At some level, we are all aware of the intellectual bankruptcy
of comprehensive formalism and of the inadequacies of realism. 58 The
critiques above, as well as the many others, are sufficient in this respect. At
the same time, the remains of formalism and realism are entrenched. The
forms of thought, the habits, the considerations, and the techniques are to
be found all throughout law's empire.
Both formalism and realism are impossible. Indeed, whether
announced as a theory (formalism) or an approach (realism), neither is
adequate to describe the ways in which lawyers, judges, or legal academics
reason, interpret, or elaborate law. Neither seems adequate to describe the
identities and character of our precedential and jurisprudential
commitments. Moreover, while one might hope that the virtues of the one
might compensate for the vices of the other, this prospect remains
undemonstrated.

parameters within which legal actors can do their means-ends calculus. See Summers, Pragmatic
Instrumentalism,supra note 11, at 888.

58. See supra text accompanying notes 31-46, 53-58 (critiquing both comprehensive
formalism and realism).
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Today, one can, of course, claim to hold a formalist or a realist account
of extant law, but such claims will require one to take one of the following
unattractive stances:
(1) Dramatically and implausibly reducing the scope of what is
generally recognized as positive law. In other words, one redefines
the realm of law in highly selective ways (intellectual
gerrymandering) such that one's formalist or realist account of this
59
law is effectively made true.
(2) Dramatically and idiosyncratically redefining what it means to
be a formalist or a realist. Usually, this is accomplished by
introducing into
the one (e.g., formalism) large doses of the other
6
(e.g., realism). 0

(3) Presuming that one's proclaimed self-identification as a
comprehensive formalist or a realist is fully sufficient to make one's
self so. Typically, one commits to either approach and expects
others to believe that one's actual intellectual practices will fall ipse
dixit in line with the self-declaration.
A.

FORMALISM (IMPOSSIBLEAND ENTRENCHED)

Comprehensive formalism is now implausible as a widely shared theory
of law. And it is implausible not so much because it has succumbed to some
killer argument, but because of something much more serious:
Comprehensive formalism and its depictions of the identity and role of law
are simply no longer credible. 61 It is not that we are all "legal realists now"
(we most certainly all are not), but we are all realist enough to understand
that our law and culture are strongly flavored with practices and institutions
antithetical to comprehensive
formalism:
instrumentalism, social
engineering, bureaucratic administration, and so on. To declare one's self a
comprehensive formalist today is thus a bit akin to announcing that one is a
monarchist. It is simply not a convincing belief system given our present
legal and social conditions. Among the social and intellectual conditions
rendering comprehensive formalism obsolete are:
The permeability of law and politics;

59.

(Or partially true).

60. Larry Solum, for instance, tempers his brand of formalism with a great deal of realism.
Solum, supra note 20, at 520-22.

61.

Even those sympathetic to formalism may well agree. Paul Cox, for instance, says:
I cannot defend formalism in its pristine, classical sense

... [I]t is simply not an
accurate depiction of law as it now is, even if, which is doubtful, it once was such a
depiction. I would be guilty of malpractice if I described our law in classically

formalistic terms and if I taught it in these terms ....
Cox, supra note 18, at 61.
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The significant presence of instrumentalist modes of thought in
both law and the social sphere;
The bureaucratization of law in both the public and private sectors;
The advent of cost-benefit analysis, balancing, and totality-ofcircumstances tests in the positive law;
The widespread use of non-legal experts (social workers,
psychologists, economists, etc.) to formulate and administer law;
The infusion of economic, sociological, and empirical knowledges
in law through experts and administration;
The almost ecstatic proliferation
authoritative legal texts;

of discordant yet arguably

(One could go on).
Given these developments, if one wanted to describe law in terms of a
comprehensive formalist theory, the best strategy (there are others) 62 would
likely be to disregard or repudiate a great deal of what we take to be our own
positive law (as well as what we take to be our social circumstances).
Formalism, seen in this way, would not be demonstrably wrong, or at least no
more "demonstrably wrong" than any other jurisprudence of substance. Its
plausibility, however, would depend upon adopting a very narrow view of
what counts as law-a view generally not believable.
So, as a working theory of law, comprehensive formalism is impossible.
Too much of what we consider to be "law," and likely would wish to retain as
integral to what we call law, would have to be jettisoned or declared errant,
spurious, or otherwise pathological. 63 For a judge to be a comprehensive
formalist would render him antediluvian. For a lawyer to be a
comprehensive formalist would be malpractice. 64 And for a legal academic
to be a comprehensive formalist would entail being Ernest Weinrib. 65
B.

THE CONTINUATION OFFORMALISM SUB ROSA

And yet, one should not overestimate the defeat of comprehensive
formalism. Its maps and pathways and its concerns and anxieties, continue
to exercise control over the modern legal imagination. 66 To borrow

62.

See supra text accompanying note 55 (offering a strategy for constructing a

comprehensive formalist theory).
63. I am not being a semantic imperialist here. Formalists (and others) can define or
describe "law" however they want. I am simply making a contingent observation that "law," like
other basic terms, plays particular roles within our cultural and intellectual grammars. These
grammars will tend to render idiosyncratic definitions irrelevant or utopian or both.
64.
65.

Cox, supra note 18, at 61.
And that position is already taken. Weinib, supra, note 14.
66.
See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 815 (1989)
(discussing the virtues of the Holmesian slogan about experience and logic for "practitioners
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Maitland's felicitous phrase, comprehensive formalism "rules from the
67
grave"-and in sundry ways, too.
First, the architecture of formalism-the grid-like set of distinctions
(tort/contracts), the hierarchy in the layers of law (constitution/statutes/
common law), the aesthetic ideals (gaplessness, precision, etc.)-all that and
more, remains. 68 Perhaps this architecture is in ruins, but it has not
disappeared. As many have noted, even today, the law-school curriculum of
the first year remains much the same as it was in the late nineteenth century.
Second, one finds the discrete and localized strains of comprehensive
formalism throughout the legal landscape. Discrete doctrine-sets, distinct
modes of legal interpretation, 69 and legal reasoning bear the imprints of
comprehensive formalism. Thomas Grey helpfully describes "neo-formalism"
that
in just this way-as these residual forms and associated arguments
70
ways.
interstitial
or
hoc
ad
in
if
even
deployed,
be
continue to
Third, the meaning, significance, and hold of these neo-formalist
arguments owe something to the residual appeal of comprehensive
formalism. Like a primordial "legal unconscious," comprehensive formalism
provides a depth and a resonance to interstitial neo-formalist arguments and
conceptions. If neo-formalist imperatives such as "heed the plain meaning of
the text" seem appealing to some people (and awful to others), it is in part
because those imperatives resonate in a deep, not fully conscious
background of comprehensive legal formalism.
Fourth, comprehensive formalism remains a temptation-particularly
for legal academics. In a powerful (and not fully explained) sense,
comprehensive formalism remains, for many legal academics, a kind of
closet ideal. All this theorizing, modeling, and paradigm-building; all this
highly conceptualist work; and all this automatic insistence on elegance,
coherence, systematicity, and precision regardless of context 7' suggest the
continued hold of the formalist ideal on the American legal-academic
imagination.
and scholars who work in a context in which Langdellian formalism retains a primeval and

often unrecognized power").
67.
FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW I (Alfred Henry Chatory
& William Joseph Whittaker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1936) ("The forms of action we have
buried, but they still rule us from their graves.").
68. Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 1, at 1055-70 (describing the aesthetic of the grid).
69. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law and the Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1184 (1989) (endorsing "the plain meaning of the text" as a favored method of
interpretation--one that leads to the formulation of clear commands and clear rules).
70. See Grey, The New Formalism, supra note 10 (discussing the revival of formalism in the
modern era). Grey "portrays the new formalists (Justice Scalia is taken as representative) as
characterized by their pursuit of four jurisprudential strands: objectivism, originalism,
textualism, and conceptualism." Id.

71. Elegance, coherence, and the like are not qualities to sneer at. At the same time, one
gets the sense that some legal commentators insist on these qualities without regard to
context-that is to say, without regard to the particular aims of inquiry or the objects of inquiry.
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REALISM IN RUINS

Fifth, in a more profound sense, one wonders whether we could have a
conception of "law" that is devoid of formalism. To put it positively, it just
may be that as a matter of our cultural and intellectual grammars, law and
formalism are inextricably intertwined. If so, the eradication of formalism
might be tantamount to the elimination of what we, as a cultural and
intellectual matter, take "law" to be.
C. REAiLISM (IMPOSSIBLE AND ENTRENCHED)
As a stand-alone project for law, realism is not plausible. There are
simply too many aspects of contemporary law that render realism
implausible as a complete account. Among these conditions are formal
architectural features of law-many of which remain in place (even if
sometimes in disrepair):
Stare Decisis;
Controlling Case Doctrine;
Conceptual Analysis;
The Hierarchy of Sources of Law;
Subject-Specific Divisions and Discourses (contracts vs. torts); and
Formal Institutional Identities (corporations, lessors, etc.).
Realism can furnish justifications for these architectural features of law.
And realist considerations can give shape and substance to these
architectural features. All of this is to say that a realist approach can endorse
a localized legal regime that partakes, for instance, of conceptualism or
systematicity or other formalist traits. But on pain of self-rejection, what
realism cannot do is to become that sort of formalist regime.
Realism depends upon a certain degree of pre-existing architecture. 72 It
needs at least some unadorned dogmatism (not very realist) and mechanical
or unquestioning repetition (again not very realist) of basic identities and
fundamental-reasoning operations. Realism itself is not that architecture.
The architecture must be found elsewhere and it must offer sufficient
resistance to realist challenges over time. To put it another way, realism is
aprs-coup-itis and remains dependent on a pre-existing architecture. And
in American law, it is formalism that provides that architecture.
Meanwhile, the challenge that realism poses to formal architectures is
well known. If left unchecked over time, instrumentalism, practicality, and
contextualism will integrate ends, purposes, and objectives into legal
identities (until those identities eventually lose their integrity). 73 Another

72. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra note 11, at 918-21 (noting that "pragmatic
instrumentalism" depends heavily on "implementive machinery").
73. Jeremy Waldron makes a similar point about the way in which functionalism corrodes
legal concepts:
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way of putting it is that some architecture and some relatively fixed and
enduring identities are needed, if only to think, and these cannot be
74
furnished by consequentialism, practicality, and contextualism alone.
D. RALISM

FoRMAIJZED

And yet even if realism is impossible, it cannot be avoided. Our law is
now fraught with explicitly instrumental tests, balancing methodologies,
multi-factor tests, and a well-entrenched commitment to policy analysis.
There is an ironic (yet quite real) sense in which realism is now the new
formalism. The realist tests, doctrines, rules, and policies are now
thoroughly formalized into our law. And what could be more unreflective,
automatic, and pro forma these days than a balancing test or cost-benefit
analysis or a totality-of-circumstances test? 75 These little items have reached
almost comprehensive status-such that a per se rule, a categorical decision
must now automatically be defended on a kind of global cost-benefit
analysis. What once seemed-in the time of the legal realists and the
sociological jurisprudes of the 1920s and 1930s-to be a studied extra-legal
consideration of social consequences has now become internalized in law. It
is an exaggeration, but there is an odd sense in which instrumentalism,
functionalism, consequentialism, and policy analysis have become the
formalism of our time. When we do policy analysis, it seems as if, for any
given substantive subject matter, only certain select policies count.
Moreover, the policies that do count tend to be those that have already been
internalized within positive law. Indeed, in our legal analyses, we are
typically far removed from considering all the consequences of any doctrinal
choice. Moreover, often we are not actually considering them, and certainly
not all of them.
E.

CRITIQUES INTERRUPTED

Ironically, the sense that the legal landscape is littered with the ruins of
formalism and realism isn't simply a challenge to these two determinations.
It is also a challenge to the critiques. Indeed, the critiques of both formalism

But if a given [legal] term is defined in this way [functionally], then it will be
identified (for each legal system) with the actual criteria that happen to be used at
a given time to determine whether or not the concept applies. Change the criteria,
and you change the concept. The trouble with this is that you then lose the ability
of the concept to mark connections with other concepts-connections that survive
such changes in applicability.
Waldron, supra note 14, at 50.
74.

Summers makes this point convincingly. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism, supra

note 11, at 909-16.
75. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE LJ. 943,
944-45 (1987) (arguing that the balancing approach has permeated modem constitutional
interpretation in spite of its shortcomings).
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and realism have been insufficient to remove either one from the legal
corpus.
Moreover, for all their initial plausibility, there is an eerie sense in
which the critiques of formalism and realism might be compromised as well.
Indeed, if one can step back from the dispute for a moment and hold one's
commitments in abeyance, one can come to recognize that the ostensible
failure of formalism or realism is that each fails to live up to the ideals and
functions championed by the other.
Consider formalism first. Notice that the critiques of formalism
(arbitrariness, inefficacy, dogmatism, and incoherence) work by removing
the grounds (fields of application, sources of law, modalities, and frames)
upon which formalism depends for its cogency. In such circumstances, the
failure of formalism cannot really surprise: Indeed, if we remove the
grounds from any approach and demand that it justify itself on inhospitable
grounds or in terms of non-conforming ideals, it will, of course, fail. What
else could be expected? The same thing seems true of the critiques of
realism. These arguments about realism's structural vacancy, infidelity to
law, endless deferral, and authority deficits may seem initially compelling.
And yet in the next moment, the arguments appear to collapse into mere
observations that realism fails to live up to formalist ideals. Of course, it fails:
Realism wasn't trying to live up to the identity or ideals of formalism in the
first place!
At this point, we have reasons to doubt, not merely the cogency of
formalism and realism, but the cogency of their respective critiques as well.
Indeed, we can wonder whether the critiques are anything more than the
tracing of the implications of either approach followed by a negative
evaluation. In turn, we can wonder whether a negative evaluation is any
more than the attachment of a negative qualifier to a positive trait.
"Structural vacancy" (a critique of realism) sounds bad, but is it any more
than a negative term corresponding to the more appealing notion of a
"flexible approach"? "Authoritarianism" (a critique of formalism) sounds
bad, but is it any more than a negative term applied to a "definitive
approach"?
Is this all simply argument by thesaurus? Are the critiques collapsed as
well? Does their possible collapse then mean that formalism and realism live
to fight another day? Perhaps so.
F

STRATEGIES OFRECONSTRUCTION

Efforts at reconstructions from the ruins are offered in a variety of
techniques deployed throughout the legal landscape. These techniques are
instanced at different levels of generality (everything from grand theory to
the interpretation of traffic ordinances). And they too have become
stereotyped:
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Hierarchy: One can subordinate formalism to realism or vice versa. In
other words, one can allow one to trump or subsume the other. To give a
simple example, some legal thinkers believe that policies and principles
should govern the scope of rule application. 76 Other legal thinkers believe
that rules limit the effective scope of policies and that when there are rules,
77
it is best to apply them without regard to their supporting reasons.
Needless to say, hierarchy as a solution can be made more complex or
nuanced. For instance, the hierarchy could be softened into a mere
presumption in favor of formalism or realism. 78 Or a presumption defeasible
upon certain conditions. Or... (and so on).
Sectorization: Another solution is to recognize that one working theory
(e.g., formalism) is more appropriate in some specified circumstances or
subject-matter areas than the other working theory (e.g., realism). 79 This
sectorization strategy can be formulated at a very abstract level (e.g.,
property/torts) or at a more concrete level (e.g., design/manufacturing
defect). As with the hierarchy strategy, all sorts of permutations and nuances
are possible: presumptions, presumptions defeasible upon certain
conditions, etc.
Background/Foreground: If we think about the relations of the two
polarities in terms of background/foreground, then it is safe to say that most
legal thinkers and judges view the ruins of comprehensive formalism as the
background, the ground, the frame, the baselines, and the settled law within
which realism must do its work.
But there is nothing necessary about taking formalism as the given
background. The background/foreground image can be flipped. One can
take realism as the background and view formal doctrinal line-drawing as the
foreground activity. This transposition comes close to a view of law Felix
Cohen eloquently expressed in terms of "unified field theory" back in the

76. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 7, at 1483-84
interpretation" that subordinates rules to policies).
77.

(offering a "dynamic statutory

See Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er Nuthin'": Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U.

CHI. L. REV. 530, 551-52 (1999) (arguing against reading rules in light of their background
purposes).
78.
FRED SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
29-31 (2009); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1101, 1178-79

(1993). Weinberg argues:
The fact that law application sometimes works best as a nuanced, nonrule-bound,
discretionary process seems like a necessary evil, an exception to the way that legal
reasoning-that is, rule application-is supposed to work ....Rules are what law is
about. Standards, as a result, are what we use in the cases when it seems that rules
won't work.
Id.
79. Russell Korobkin notes that this approach describes what most legal scholars do.
Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L.
REv. 23, 23-24 (2000).
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1950s.80 And it is also one of the visions of law announced by some Critical
81
Legal Studies ("CLS") thinkers.
Eclecticism: One could decide that the appropriateness of formalist or
realist approaches is context-specific. 8 2 In other words, it depends on the
issue in question, the rule applied, the field of application, the kind of
personnel affected, the values at stake (and so on). The choice for one or
83
the other is viewed as situational.
Balancing and Commensuration: One can also decide whether formalism
or realism is more appropriate by balancing the virtues and vices of one
approach against the other. 84 This sort of balancing can be done in dollars
85
(or dollar equivalents, utils, or in an ad hoc way).
Decisionism: One can simply abjure prior methodological commitments
86
and decide as choices present themselves.
80. Cohen, Field 77eory, supra note 14, at 241.
81. One can, for instance, describe law as a field of conflicting policies or interests and see
doctrines as provisional truce lines between the antagonistic background forces. Irreconcilable
policy conflicts are viewed as fundamental; meanwhile, doctrinal distinctions are viewed as
transient. Duncan Kennedy attributes this vision to Von Jhering and Demogue:
What makes Demogue a founder of conflicting considerations analysis is that he,
like Jhering, identified a trade-off that is built into the law-making process. When
one thing goes up (security of transaction), something else must go down (static
security). This means that it never makes sense, when justifying a rule, to say that it
is good because it promotes security of transaction. To make sense, one must add:
at an acceptable cost to static security. Likewise forJhering, it never makes sense to
justify a rule by appeal to its administrability-one must always add: and its
acceptable cost in over- or under-inclusiveness. This is the basic difference between
the conflicting considerations model and the rival approach to policy analysis that
identifies one policy per rule.
Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's
"ConsiderationandForm,"100 COLUM. L. REv. 94, 113 (2000).
This particular vision, which presents policy as background and line-drawing as
foreground has a great deal of appeal if one takes the long-term view. With a timeline of a
decade or two, one can easily observe that the policies do not change much over time, while the
doctrinal lines shift back and forth. (At least this will seem right in many, even if not all, areas of
law.)
82. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory
of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1251-55 (1983) (developing an "eclectic"
approach for freedom of speech); Grey, The New Formalism, supra note 10, at 9.
83. Ironically, it often turns out that the situation, the scene, and the action are
themselves susceptible to characterization both in formalist as well as in realist terms. See infra
text accompanying notes 137-42 (describing a battle of framing between Justices Holmes and
Cardozo).
84. See Korobkin, supra note 79, at 42-43 (noting that the law and economics literature
yields no obvious general preference for rules or standards).
85. For elaboration, see Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 1, at 1090-91.
86. Choosing between formalism and realism can also be done spontaneously. This would
accord variously with existentialist philosophy, irrationalism, or decisionism. The notion here is
that the choice of how to formulate or apply doctrine is irreducible. It is never fully dictated by
knowledge, reason, or the like. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
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Now, all of these approaches have some surface plausibility. But the
irony is that when viewed together in the order above-from hierarchy
through background/foreground all the way to decisionism-it becomes
apparent that we have replicated a spectrum running from formalism to
realism.
TECHNIQUES OF RECONSTRUCTION

Formalism
Hierarchy
Sectorization
Foreground/Background
Eclecticism
Balancing and Commensuration
Decisionism
Realism

Once one takes note of this spectrum, it becomes but a small step to
recognize that the very strategies of reconstruction laid out above replicate
the formal tensions rather than resolve them. In other words, the tensions
have been repeated at a higher (methodological) level of abstractionnotably, in the array of choices among reconstructive techniques.
The compound irony is that the presentation of all these techniques at
once does not demonstrably resolve the formalism vs. realism tensions, but
rather, adds to the sense of intractability and complexity. There are now that
87
many more approaches to formalism vs. realism.
The reconstructive techniques are themselves inscribed throughout our
law and in the cognitive orientations of jurists and legal thinkers. The
techniques of reconstruction are repeatedly settled and unsettled, and
repeatedly reaffirmed and rejected throughout our law. No technique ever
decisively vanquishes the others. Indeed, every technique remains
entrenched in American law as an already-operative form or a dormant form
ready to be reactivated.

89 HARv.L. REV. 1685, 1775 (1976). Decisionism would entail what Carl Schmitt called "a pure
decision not based on reason and discussion and not justifying itself, that is, to an absolute
decision created out of nothingness." CARL SCHMITT, POLITIcAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON

THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 66 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi Press 2005). Schmitt was
a right-wing Catholic theorist-one of the leading legal thinkers of the Weimar period. In 1933,
he joined the Nazi party and remained a Nazi until 1945.
87. The form of legal consciousness that corresponds to the embrace of all of these
techniques (in their own place and time) might be likened to whatJustin Desautels-Stein calls
"eclectic pragmatism." See generally Justin Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping
Pragmatismin ContemporaryLegalAnalysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565.
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With the failures of the great reconstructive efforts, jurists and legal
commentators operate adrift in an odd admixture of realist and formalist
legal materials. It is, of course, conceivable that the combinations of
formalism and realism have providentially congealed into some rational and
coherent arrangement. It may be, for instance, that formalism and realism
somehow compensate each other for their shortcomings. Or it may be that
the eclectic distribution of formalist and realist moments throughout our
law responds to some ostensibly rational extra-legal variable-the
transactional context, the facts, the situation sense, the invisible hand, or
some such thing.
It may be that there is some rationality to all this. But to date, there has
been no demonstration of the point and no secure knowledge acquired on
the question. Moreover, one rather doubts that such global knowledge could
be achieved. None of this is to suggest that the actual deployment of
formalism or realism in legal commentary, judicial opinions, statutes, and
regulations is arbitrary. There has been no demonstration of that point
either.
G.

SO WHAT?

To be more precise: So what that our two ruling views of law, formalism
and realism, are each at once impossible and entrenched? Why care?
One answer, at least from a juridical perspective, is that the efficacy and
redemption of law, the rule of law, and justice (indeed, many of the crucial
values associated with law) ostensibly depend upon our knowing what we are
doing when we do law. The simultaneous entrenchment and impossibility of
our two ruling views casts doubts upon such a claim to knowledge in any
strong sense. 88 We do not know whether or when to be formalists or realists
or somewhere in between in our choices about how to discern, interpret,
elaborate, or fashion law. 89
One could, of course, simply assert that scholars, judges, legislators, and
agency heads always, or often, or generally choose "correctly" between
formalism and realism in the relevant context. But such assertions fall
somewhat short of convincing. For one thing, scholars, judges, legislators,
and agency heads tend to be quite divided (in multiple ways) about the
appropriate approach. For another thing, there's just no basis-short of
intuitionistjudgment-to redeem such specific claims.
That does not mean that we are done with the formalism vs. realism
disputes. On the contrary, they continue on in the form of localized variants.
88. This is not to say that in some given context we will not have a strong sense whether to
favor realism or formalism. But in law, a "sense" is not generally accorded the same status as
"knowledge."
89. In philosophy, of course, the fact that the interpretive community may be divided on
some question does not preclude the possibility that one side is simply wrong. But one should
not mistake law for philosophy, nor presume that the former is the latter's colony.
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IV. THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE: THE LOCALIZED
VARIANTS OF FORMALISM VS. REALISM

In keeping with the continued presence of formalism and realism, their
intellectual infirmity, and their impossibility as grand visions, the formalism
vs. realism disputes continue, albeit on a smaller scale as "localized variants."
These variants can be localized in two senses of the term. First, they can be
localized in that they concern a particular substantive subject matter (e.g.,
antitrust law, the standard of care in negligence, etc.). Second, they can be
localized in the sense that they center on one or maybe just a few of the
constitutive traits associated with formalism and realism (e.g., contextualism
vs. comprehensiveness, autonomy vs. constructionism).
Overall, one can say that contemporary positive law is an admixture in
which prescriptions, proscriptions, delegations, formalities, interpretive
techniques, and reasoning modes (and much more) by turn mutate and
precipitate in all sorts of ways in accordance with the interactive patterns of
the formalism vs. realism disputes. 90
Here, by way of example, are several localized variants of the dispute
(which will be mapped out and discussed at length below):
Forms of Directives
Value Forms
Interpretation

Rules vs. Standards
Formal vs. Substantive
Textualist vs. Purposive

These are variants inasmuch as they echo each other (echoes of echoes
of echoes ... ). In the contemporary moment, these localized variants
emerge in the academic literature, draw significant interest, inspire highpitched intellectual fervor, and then quietly settle down, leaving nothing in
their wake until they are picked up and revived some time later.
The commonalities among these disputes are presented here in
aesthetic rather than analytical terms. 9 1 The effort thus demands from the
reader a certain aesthetic sensibility for recognizing the commonalities. The
point is to appreciate how the localized variants are, as a matter of form,
versions of each other.

90. And in using the term "interactive patterns," I am referring to the assortment of
reconstructive strategies for deciding between formalism and realism. See supra text
accompanying notes 76-87 (discussing strategies for reconstruction).
91. I use the term "aesthetics" throughout this article in the sense elaborated in my
previous article, Aesthetics of American La. "In this conception, the aesthetic pertains to the
forms, images, tropes, perceptions, and sensibilities that help shape the creation, apprehension,
and even identity of human endeavors, including, most topically, law." Schlag, Aesthetics, supra
note 1, at 1050. This conception of aesthetics tracks with the recent efforts to reacquaint
numerous social and intellectual enterprises with their aesthetic character. See generally
WOLFGANG WELSCH, UNDOING AESTHETICS (Andrew Inkpin trans., Sage Publ'ns Ltd. 1997)
(arguing that aesthetics assist in understanding many aspects of cultural and intellectual life).
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A.

RuLES vs. STANDARDS

Disputes over the relative virtues and vices of the "bright-line rule" and
the "flexible standard" are ubiquitous-encountered in many fields, from
criminal procedure to the Uniform Commercial Code to constitutional law
(to just about every subject matter in the law school curriculum). Rules are
said to be certain and predictable, and standards are said to be flexible and
adaptive. On the negative side, rules are said to be rigid and mechanical,
and standards are said to be fuzzy and indeterminate.
Rules and standards are different forms that a directive can take. A
directive has a trigger (also called predicate or hypothesis) and a response.
The rule form of a directive about residential noise might be: "Noises above
eighty decibels are punishable by a one-hundred-dollar fine." The standard
form might be read as follows: "Excessively loud noises are punishable by an
appropriate penalty."
The pioneering work on rules vs. standards was done by Duncan
Kennedy, who described a dialectical form of argument pitting the "brightline rule" against "the flexible standard." 92 The arguments, as Kennedy
pointed out, come in highly stereotyped form. Hence they can be
suggestively mapped out in chart form-as in the following slightly abridged
and revised version of Kennedy's original chart:

92. Kennedy, supra note 86, at 1689-90. Prior to Kennedy's work, there does not seem to
have been much in the way of sustained analysis of rules vs. standards in the American legal
literature. There is a passing reference in the Hart and Sacks materials. Id. (citing H. Hart & A.
Sacks, The Legal Process 155-58 (1958) (unpublished manuscript)); see also Roscoe Pound,
Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REV. 475, 482-83, 485-86
(1933) (stating that rules prescribe definite, detailed legal consequences to a definite set of
detailed facts; standards, by contrast, specify a general limit of permissible conduct requiring
application in view of the particular facts of the case). The conceptions of rules and standards
used in this Article follow Kennedy, Hart, and Sacks's conceptions.
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93
THE RULES VS. STANDARDS DIALECTIC

PRO RULES

CON RULES

PRO STANDARDS

CON STANDARDS

You see, rules
are good
because they
make law..,

What nonsense!
Rules are bad
because they
make law. . .

What nonsense!
Standards are
bad because they
make law...

Determinate
Simple
Sharp-edged
Definitive
Elegant
Comprehensive
Autonomous

Mechanistic
Crude
Rigid
Authoritarian
Reductionist
Closed
Insular

In fact, it's really
standards that
are good
because they
make law...
Flexible
Complex
Elastic
Contextual
Textured
Open-ended
Connected

Vague
Muddy
Fuzzy
Variable
Messy
Inchoate
Dependent

This is a relatively simple vices-and-virtues view of the rules vs. standards
dispute, but it nonetheless summarizes accurately a great deal of the
arguments commonly made for and against rules and standards. If
illustration is needed, consider the ways in which the adjectival
characterizations above correspond to more fully articulated arguments
94
about the relative virtues and vices of rules and standards.
As one can tell from this chart, there is a certain correspondence
betwecn the rules vs. standards dialectic and the formalism vs. realism
debate. One could say that, from an aesthetic standpoint, rules are to
standards as formalism is to realism. And concomitantly, one could also
say-again aesthetically-that arguments over rules and standards largely
track with arguments over formalism and realism. 95 Indeed, consider that the
adjectives in the chart could as easily apply to formalism and realism as they
do to rules and standards. It is as if rules and standards were a kind of
93. For Kennedy's original chart depicting the pros and cons of rules versus standards see
Kennedy, supra note 86, at 1710-11. For further recent discussions of rules vs. standards, see
generally LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE
DILEMMAS OF LAW 32-33 (2001); RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 21128 (1995); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); RICHARD
POSNER, THE PROBLEM OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-53 (1990); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE
(1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992);
Kennedy, supra note 86, at 1741-76; Korobkin, supra note 79; Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules,
and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 107-16 (1997); Schlag, Rules and Standards,
supranote 1; Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justice of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57-95
(1992).
94. See supra notes 91-93 and infra note 95 and accompanying text (providing
illustrations).
95. This is not to say, of course, that one cannot make formalist arguments for standards
or standard-like arguments for formalism. Nor is it to say that one cannot make realist
arguments for rules or rule-like arguments for realism.
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artifactual version of formalism vs. realism. Or, to put it conversely, it is as if
formalism vs. realism was a theoretical abstraction of rules vs. standards.
The ubiquity of rules vs. standards and formalism vs. realism extends
much further. Indeed, once one becomes familiar with the rules vs.
standards dialectic, one starts to recognize it throughout law's doctrinal
empire. It comes from far out of the past and traverses all borderlands in
law's empire. Here are just a few illustrative examples:
Possession
Procedural Due Process
Equal Protection
Incorporation
Contracts/Parol Evidence

96
Certain Control vs. Hot Pursuit
97
Dignitary vs. Instrumental View

Tiered Review vs. Sliding Scale98
Total Incorporationvs. FundamentalRights99
Four Corners vs. Intent of the Parties100

96. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). This is the great first-year lawschool fox-hunt case wherein the court had to decide whether property in the fox vested upon
"certain control" (the rule) or "hot pursuit" (the standard). Notice how in the following
account, both the rules vs. standards dialectic and the substantive issues are blended together:
Pierson thus presents two great principles, seemingly at odds, for defining
possession: (1) notice to the world through a clear act, and (2) reward to useful
labor. The latter principle, of course, suggests a labor theory of property. The
owner gets the prize when he "mixes in his labor" by hunting. On the other hand,
the former principle suggests at least a weak form of the consent theory: the
community requires clear acts so that it has the opportunity to dispute claims, but
may be thought to acquiesce in individual ownership where the claim is clear and no
objection is made.
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 73, 77 (1985) (emphasis
added); see also Henry Smith, Possession as the Origin of Property, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1119
(2003) (advocating the pro-rule side, noting that, generally speaking, possession must be
defined for large heterogeneous audiences-hence, the need for a clear rule). But see, Andrea
McDowell, Legal Fictions in Pierson v. Post, 105 MICH. L. REv. 735 (2007) (deflating ever so
gently the factual and theoretical presumptions about Pierson v. Post adopted by Rose, Smith,
and others).
97.

See LAURENCE

TRIBE, AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

714-16

(2d

ed.

1988)

(discussing the differences between a dignitary and instrumentalist approach to the question
"what process is due?" and making classic anti-standard arguments against the instrumentalist
view).
98. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing in favor of a sliding-scale approach to equal protection).
99.
Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment should be construed as incorporating the entire Bill
of Rights to the states), with Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 321, 328 (1937) (rejecting
appellant's argument that the entire Bill of Rights has been extended to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment and instead adopting a fundamental-rights analysis).
100. Compare W.W.W. Assoc., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990)
(employing the four-corners approach to enforcing the terms of a contract), with Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968) (stating that
the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract is the source of contractual rights and
duties).
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If we pay attention to the arguments attending the disputes above, we
can see the rules vs. standards disputes enacted in a substantialized form.
The disputes are "substantialized" in the sense that the forms (rules vs.
standards) are blended with the substantive aspects of the disputes. 101
It bears noting that the rules vs. standards arguments comprise an
arrested dialectic-sets of ongoing, but inconclusive arguments. They do not
lead anywhere-they simply go back and forth. 102 It may be that a solution is
found-but that is only because, at some point, the argument or the dispute
is abandoned. One valorizes arguments on one side and disregards the
rest. 103
Many commentators have sought to link the rules vs. standards disputes
to substantive considerations-such as efficiency, cooperative behavior,
fairness in the individual case, and the like; but, for reasons to be adduced
later, the efforts all seem to founder. Sure: Rules are more efficient (when
the rules work as intended). Sure: Standards treat individuals fairly on their
own merits (when the standards are well administered). Sure: Rules
promote transparency (when the rules are more transparent than their
corresponding social norms).

104

B.

Sure .. .(and so on).

105

VALUE FORMS

Another localized variant of the formalism vs. realism disputes is found
in the elaboration of ostensibly fundamental legal values. Indeed, it is
relatively easy to find formalist and realist versions of fundamental legal
values such as fairness or liberty. Moreover, the arguments offered in
support or derogation of the various conceptions of fundamental legal
values bear a certain similarity to the disputes of formalism vs. realism as well
as to rules vs. standards.
Consider then the following chart of fundamental legal values:

101.
For examples of five "substantialized" disputes, see supra notes 91-95 and
accompanying text. In the positive law, the rules vs. standards dispute is most often
substantialized in this way. For an extended example, see infra notes 137-42 and accompanying
text (explaining how in Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934), Cardozo employed a
pro-standard position while Holmes employed a pro-rule position).
102. Schlag, Rules and Standards, supra note 1, at 383 (stating that an arrested dialectic
"doesn't go anywhere" because "there is no moment of synthesis").
103. Cf Kennedy, supra note 86, at 1775 (discussing the implications of contradictions and
stating that the "meaning of contradiction at the level of abstraction" is that there is no
"metasystem" that could provide guidance as to a specific mode as circumstances "required").
104. For elaboration of this problem (shallowness), see infta Part V.B.
105. There are, of course, many occasions where we will feel that the court has clearly
reached the "right" result or the "wrong" result, but this sense will be largely a function of the
way in which we imagine the relevant situation. There is nothing wrong with imagination. But
here, it is no solution at all-because the situation (whatever it may be) can be imagined in
myriad ways more or less conducive to rules or standards.
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FAIRNESS

FORMALISM
10 6
Uniform Treatment

EQUALITY

Formal Equality

10 8
110

NEUTRALIIY

Disinterestedness

FREEDOM

Negative

EFFICIENCY
AUTONOMY

Pareto
1 13
Individual Autonomy

111

REALISM

Just Deserts 107
Substantive Equality

1° 9

Even-handedness
1 12
Positive
Kaldor-Hicks
1 14
Self Realization & Capabilities

106. SCHAUER, supra note 93, at 149-53.
107. Sullivan, supra note 93, at 66 (suggesting that uniform treatment suppresses relevant
similarities and differences while a more standard-like approach treats individuals substantively
alike).
108.

FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 87 (1978). Hayek argues:

From the fact that people are very different it follows that, if we treat them equally,
the result must be inequality in their actual position, and that the only way to place
them in an equal position would be to treat them differently... [T]he desire of
making people more alike in their condition cannot be accepted in a free society
as ajustification for further and discriminatory coercion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
109. Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: "Perception"Against Lofty
Formalism, 121 HARV.L. REV. 4, 58 (2007). Nussbaum argues:
The first and most crucial suggestion is that the judge ought to think about the
rights as capabilities, asking: are people really able to enjoy this right, or are there
subtle impediments that stand between them and the full or equal access to the right?
Judges should attend closely to history and social context....
Id. (emphasis added).
110. Scott R. Peppet, ContractarianEconomics and Mediation Ethics: The Case for Customizing
Neutrality Through ContingentFee Mediation,82 TEX. L. REv. 227, 261-64 (2003).
111. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 191, 203-06
(1997) (arguing for negative liberty by contrasting it with the totalitarian implications and
potentials of positive liberty).
112. Robin West, Rights, Capabilities,and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1901, 1906-07
(2001). West argues:
Negative rights elevate or empower the citizen relative to an overreaching,
paternalistic state. Yet by staying the paternalist's intervening hand, negative rights
both subordinate that citizen to his stronger brother-thereby entrenching private
inequalities-and disable the state from securing, on behalf of weaker citizens, the
material preconditions to developing the capabilities necessary to a fully human
life.
Id.; see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 912 (2005) (contrasting modern liberty with active liberty); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference
with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129, 1132-33 (1986) (contrasting a negative
conception of freedom with a republican conception).
113. Posner, supra note 93, at 117 ("The rule of law is important if we care about autonomy,
because standards, more so than rules, encourage self-reinforcing conformity to the imagined
goals of the state rather than actions that reflect one's authentic values and interests.").
114. Nussbaum, supra note 109, at 11. Nussbaum argues:
At the heart of the CA [capabilities approach] is an idea.., that all human beings
are precious, deserving of respect and support, and that the worth of all human
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One can see relatively easily that many arguments favoring the opposing
conceptions of fairness, equality, and neutrality have a flavor of the
formalism vs. realism disputes and the rules vs. standards dialectic. Again,
the connection or entailment is not a logical one, but rather aesthetic. And
we are dealing with a nested phenomenon here. One could, within a
particular prong (say, negative liberty), find both formalist and realist
variants.
C.

TEXTUALISM VS. PURPOSIVISM

Here, consider the arguments associated with textualist as opposed to
purposive interpretation. As used here, textualist interpretation refers to the
notion that the text has a fixed legal meaning and that the text is
authoritative. 115 Textualism is thus the joinder of a claim about linguistic
meaning (words have fixed, even if sometimes vague, meanings) and a claim
about the source of legal authority (the text rules). Purposive interpretation
(as I will use the term here) encompasses other plausible contenders-such
as intentionalism, philosophical exegesis, dynamic interpretation (and so
on). 116 Purposive interpretation includes the other forms of interpretation
that hold that a legal text must be read carefully in light of intentions,
purposes, context, values, social consensus (and the like). This might be
considered a somewhat unusual way to divide the realm of legal
117
interpretation which is often considered pluralistic rather than binary.
Nonetheless, the distinction textualist vs. purposive is not arbitrary-jurists
and legal commentators generally believe that, in terms of interpretive
objects, the text is primus inter pares. Correctly or not, they generally
understand themselves to be interpreting a text.

beings is equal. What respect centrally involves, the CA holds, is supporting human
beings in the development and exercise of some central human abilities, especially
prominent among which is the faculty of selection and choice.
Id.
115. See Scalia, supranote 69, at 1183-84 (explaining plain-text interpretation).
116. My binary division here deliberately eclipses some important conventional differences
among the several standard approaches to constitutional interpretation.
117. For a helpful account of the main kinds of interpretation in constitutional law, see
PHIL BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3-122 (1982) (describing the various modes of
constitutional interpretation-historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethical).
Please note that I am not suggesting that the distinction between "textual" and
"purposive" interpretation is coherent. I have simply drawn the distinction from the perspective
of textualists-who tend to see all other contenders as impermissibly taking leave of the text for
some preferred context (e.g., framer's intent, political philosophy, etc.). My view on this
question is almost the opposite-namely that, in constitutional law, an authentic commitment
to textualism leads to just about any other kind of interpretation. Pierre Schlag, Hidingthe Ball,
71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1681, 1688-92 (1996) (showing how the earnestjudge who starts interpreting
the text of the constitution is led, out of a concern for fidelity, to adopt (by turns) plain
meaning, structural interpretation,judicial method, political theory, etc.).
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Indeed, it is fair to say that, for the past decade or more, textualism has
been a kind of stand-alone mode of interpretation-one whose character is
significantly different from the others. In part, that is because the text is
characteristically viewed as the relevant object of interpretation, whereas all
the other approaches are typically viewed as ways of interpreting the text. If
that is right, then a textualist approach might well be more formalist (heed
the text and nothing else) than the others, which all seem implicated in the
more evaluative enterprises of discerning intentions, purposes, context,
values, social consensus (and the like). Concomitantly, one can see that
there are some highly stylized pro and con arguments about textualism and
purposivism that track the formalism vs. realism dispute and the rules vs.
standards dialectic:
THE TEXTUALISM VS. PURPOSMSM DEBATE

Notice

PRO

CON

PRO

CON

TEXTUALISM

TEXTUALISM

PURPOSvIVSM

PURPOSMSM

You see,

What

In fact, it's

What

textualism is

nonsense!

really

nonsense!

good because
...

Textualism is
bad because

purposive
interpretation

Purposive
interpretation

...

that is good

is bad because

because ...

...

The text is

Without

It takes all

It looks at

public and
fixed and

context,
textualism

those
considerations

resources not
generally

therefore it
gives notice to
everyone and
establishes

results in
capricious
decisions that
thwart public

into account
that a
reasonable
interpreter

accessible to
the public.

shared

expectations of

would

expectations.

reasonable-

consider. 1 19

1 ness. 118

118. Anthony D'Amato, Counterintuitive Consequences of "PlainMeaning," 33 ARIZ. L. REV.
529, 538 (1991). He stated that:
A consequence of insisting on plain meaning ... is that it can induce a state of
mind that thrives on arbitrariness. . .. Only in those cases where the literal
construction of a statute coincides with its reasonable andjust interpretation in the
context of a given case, can the plain meaning rule be harmless.
Id.
119. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (explaining the benefits of purposive
interpretation).
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12 2

12 1

to reach a
decision.

It constrains

It allows

It forces the

It allows the

judges by

subjective

judge to

judge to use

limiting

decision

publiclyjustify

any and all

discretion and

making by

his reasoning

rationali-

subjective

allowing the

and make a

zations to

judgment. 123

judge to treat

convincing

reach his

as law whatever

argument.

favorite
result. 125

the text means
to him and
hide his
reasons. 124

120. Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 351 (2005); Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 123-26 (2000).
121. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 126 (1961).
122. Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons and the Limits of Practical Reason: A
Response to Farber and Ross, 45 VAND. L. REv. 579, 586 (1992) ("[A] legislature and the
administrative agencies within the same jurisdiction are linked by an incredibly dense network
of relationships and shared activities. ... Like family members, they develop a shared and
specialized set of linguistic understandings based on this continuous, intense relationship.").
123.

ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 5-7, 143-160 (1990).

124. Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why It Matters: Statutory
Conversations and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV.
955, 1037 (2005) Craig states:
In taking an "acontextual" textualist reading of such statutes-the reading of an
outsider "ordinary person" coming cold to the most recent statutory
pronouncements-the strict plain meaning approach ignores the statute's dialogic
dimension, the evolved and evolving meanings accepted by the relevant
subculture, allowing Justices using that approach to exploit textual imprecision
and historical terms of art to impose their own meaning on the statutory language.
Id.
125. SeeSCALIA, supra note 6, at 36 (discussing howjudges typically will not follow legislative
history when it does not support the outcome they want by saying it is, "as a whole,
inconclusive").
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Source of Law

PRO
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PRO
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TEXTUALISM

PURPOSIVISM
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history. 12 6

context. This
would be
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contexts.
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contexts that
could be
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"Judges have
legitimacy only

Textualism
cuts out
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The court must
speak in terms
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custom,

as long as they
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"sufficientiy
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stick to facts,
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be accepted by

popular
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furnish 'facts
to study, not
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meaning to the
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law.
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irreducibly
value1 33
laden."

convictions to
demonstrate
130

about.'"

126. William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLAL. REv. 621, 647-48 (1990) (tracing
to Holmes the formalist argument that the "courts must never lose sight of the text, which is
formally all that Congress enacts into law" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
127. Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1913, 1917 (2006)
(arguing that a strict constructionist textualism that disregards context can lead to absurd
results).
128. See id. (describing the pitfalls of using the plain meaning of words and disregarding
context when interpreting statutory language).
129. See id. at 1924-25 (presenting the textualist argument that judges could use
purposivism to slant statutory language to fit their views).
130. Sullivan, supra note 93, at 80 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
1000 (1992)).
131.
See Craig,supra note 124, at 1037 (arguing the textualist approach ignores "the evolved
and evolving meanings accepted by the relevant subculture").
132. Planned Parenthood,505 U.S. at 866.
133. Sullivan, supra note 93, at 80.
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English."

As with formalism vs. realism, rules vs. standards, and the values debate,
we encounter here a familiar formal pattern of stereotyped, but
inconclusive, arguments.
D. SUMMARY
Even though inconclusive, these localized variants continue to occupy
the American legal scene. At the theoretical level, there is not much hope
that one or the other may triumph. We have already seen why: The ruins of
formalism and realism are entrenched. They are inscribed in the positive law
as forms of interpretation, reasoning, and elaboration. They are
institutionalized in law as the very forms within which law and its ostensibly
authoritative artifactual forms (doctrines, principles, policies, and values)
are articulated and processed. And they are entrenched not simply as ideas,
but as the cognitive and social practices of lawyers, judges, legal
commentators, and a variety of officials.
V.

MAPPING THE

LocIcs OF COLLAPSE

When a particular dispute in legal thought "feels dead"-that is to say,
predictable, repetitive, and wearisome-it may be a sign that it has become
ritualized, and that, contrary to representations, it is no longer in command
of its ostensible subject matter. It has become ceremony.
It is certainly conceivable that this is true of the realism vs. formalism
debates. Indeed, as one becomes accustomed to recognizing the formalism
vs. realism disputes and their localized variants, two insights become
increasingly irresistible. One insight is that versions of the dispute and its

134.

Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509,528 (1988).

135.

Id.

FORMALISM AND REALISM IN RUINS

localized variants are ubiquitous. The disputes seem to emerge everywhere.
And not just in law, but in all aspects of life, the humanities, and the social
sciences. 136 A second insight, perhaps occasioned by the first, is that there is
a kind of floating quality to the disputes and their localized variants. One
starts to see that there is a certain drama of form that is repeated everywhere
and that it has a certain patterned character that sometimes seems eerily
detached (or detachable) from the substantive concerns or the particular
context. It can easily seem as if the drama of form is simply superimposed,
translated into the substantive concerns. It begins to feel gratuitous. Indeed,
it even begins to seem as if one could take just about any tension of culture
or law and easily transform it into a formalism vs. realism dispute or one of
its localized variants.
It all has the aura of an elaborate game. If we are to see our way
through the formalism and realism disputes, then it is important to be able
to experience their vacancy, their gratuitous character. In this section, we
explore the moves through which the cogency of the formalism vs. realism
disputes disintegrates. The claim here is that for all the efforts to resolve
these disputes by reference to normative and legal virtues such as efficiency,
notice, cooperative harmony, rule of law, fairness, transaction cost
reduction, human flourishing, and on and on, the arguments often founder
on one or more critical moves:
Recursivity
Shallowness
Individuation
Displacement
Sometimes, one can deploy these moves consciously (in which case the
moves seem like tactics). Sometimes the moves just happen (in which case
they feel like experiences).

136.

Indeed, the contributions of the formalism vs. realism divide extend far beyond law. As

William James, the great American pragmatist, put it:
In manners we find formalists and free-and-easy persons. In government,
authoritarians and anarchists. In literature, purists or academicals, and realists. In
art, classics and romantics. You recognize these contrasts as familiar; well, in
philosophy we have a very similar contrast expressed in the pair of terms
"rationalist" and "empiricist," "empiricist" meaning your lover of facts in all their
crude variety, "rationalist" meaning your devotee to abstract and eternal principles.
No one can live an hour without both facts and principles, so it is a difference
rather of emphasis; yet it breeds antipathies of the most pungent character
between those who lay the emphasis differently; and we shall find it extraordinarily
convenient to express a certain contrast in men's ways of taking their universe, by
talking of the "empiricist" and of the "rationalist" temper. These terms make the
contrast simple and massive.
WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM, A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING 9 (1907); see also

id. at 12 (explaining the different characteristics of rationalists and empiricists).
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These moves are in a sense shortcuts to the collapse of vices and virtues
arguments about the localized variants. They show the ways to exit from the
grip of arguments about the relative vices and virtues of rules vs. standards,
formal vs. substantive values, textualism vs. purposivism.
Three caveats, however . . . First, none of the moves is in any sense a
killer argument. Whether a formalism vs. realism dispute seems to fall apart
under pressure from one of these moves is contextual. Second, none of this
is intended to show that the arguments that comprise the formalism vs.
realism disputes or the resulting choices are without consequences. Rather,
the claim is that the consequences are not necessarily as advertised. Third,
these moves do not necessarily compel the disintegration of formalism vs.
realism disputes in any context. One will often retain the sense that a
formalism vs. realism dispute matters tremendously in some given context.
When that happens (and it does), it will be either because the dispute does
matter or because one has been taken in.
Below I have sought to illustrate the moves with a random assortment of
illustrations from the various localized variants. But please understand: Each
of the moves-recursivity, shallowness, individuation, and displacementcan be deployed throughout all variants of the formalism vs. realism
disputes.
A.

RECURSIVITY

Recursivity implies that before one decides whether to be realist or
formalist, to favor a rule or a standard, or to stick with the text or consult
purposes, one has already pre-figured the scene, the actors, the action, the
goals, and the values in realist or formalist ways. Even as one frames the
problem, the issue, or the dilemma-one has always already encountered
and enacted the very drama of form one is trying to resolve or explain.
One can see this easily in the justly famous Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.
v. Goodman and Pokora v. Wabash Railway "stop, look, and listen" railroad
cases decided by Justice Holmes and justice Cardozo, respectively.13 7 At issue
substantively was the standard of care required by a driver upon coming to
an unguarded railroad crossing. Holmes argued for a stop-and-look rule.
Cardozo argued for a due care standard. Both offered some relatively
stylized rules vs. standards arguments. But, what is most interesting as one
looks at the opinions (and it is borne out in the recital of the factual
descriptions) is that Holmes and Cardozo were dealing with very different
images of railroad crossings.
For Holmes, railroad crossings generally look alike, present the same
dilemmas, and thus invite laying down a rule. Consider what Holmes says to
justify his rule. He explains that when a man goes upon a railroad track, he

137. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), limited in Pokora v. Wabash Ry.
Co, 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
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knows he will be killed if a train comes. He knows-and now, this is the
138
crucial part-that "he must stop for the train, not the train stop for him."
Here, Holmes is effectively characterizing the operative facts concerning
drivers going through unguarded railroad crossings. What are these facts?
They are generalized facts-imputed, apparently, to all drivers: the driver
knows that he must stop for the train, not the train stop for him. Now, if those are
the operative facts (not just in this case, but in all railroad crossing cases),
then, of course, the responsibility rests on the driver, and of course, it makes
sense to impose a rule like "stop and look." Indeed, the appropriateness of
the rule-form has already been prefigured in Holmes's characterization of
the operative facts, the relevant context-to wit: the knowledge of drivers
generally upon coming to railroad crossings. 139 Holmes was a bit of a
40
formalist in his depiction of the factual setting. 1
As for Cardozo's standard, it is already rhetorically anticipated in his
recitation of the facts. For Cardozo, railroad-crossing liabilities have nothing
to do with what drivers know generally and everything to do with the
apparently variegated physical layout of railroad crossings and the widely
varying risks and benefits of the possible precautions that drivers could take.
The point is demonstrated in Cardozo's appropriately lengthy recitation of
various railroad-crossing scenarios. 141 Cardozo's view of railroad crossings is

138. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 275 U.S. at 70.
139. There are other ways of explaining Holmes's decision. I will mention one, if only
because it is an interesting sidelight on the case. It appears that there was no evidence as to
whether Goodman, the driver, actually looked or not. In such cases, the burden would seem to
rest upon the defendant railroad to show that the driver did not look. That at least was the rule
invoked by the lower court. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 10 F.2d 58, 59 (6th Cir. 1926)
(citing Beckham v. Hines, 279 F. 241, 243 (6th Cir. 1922)), rev'd, Bait. & Ohio R.R Co., 275 U.S.
at 70. The appellate court in Beckham stated: "In the absence of satisfactory evidence to the
contrary on the part of eyewitnesses, the law presumes that decedent looked and listened
before crossing the track." Beckham, 279 F. at 243. Holmes's adoption of the stop-and-look
rule-requiring affirmative evidence of looking by the driver-thus arguably seems like a
reaching pro-defendant, pro-railroad evidentiary gambit.
140. Another way of characterizing Holmes's view is that he has an entirely different factual
context in mind here-not so much railroad crossings, but rather courts sitting in judgment on
these railroad-crossing accidents.
141. This, then, is Cardozo's decidedly baroque-read: standard-like-view of railroad
crossings (and what they might require byway of safety precautions by drivers):
Standards of prudent conduct are declared at times by courts, but they are taken
over from the facts of life. To get out of a vehicle and reconnoiter is an uncommon
precaution, as everyday experience informs us. Besides being uncommon, it is very
likely to be futile, and sometimes even dangerous. If the driver leaves his vehicle
when he nears a cut or curve, he will learn nothing by getting out about the perils
that lurk beyond. By the time he regains his seat and sets his car in motion, the
hidden train may be upon him. Often the added safeguard will be dubious though
the track happens to be straight, as it seems that this one was, at all events as far as
the station, about five blocks to the north. A train traveling at a speed of thirty
miles an hour will cover a quarter of a mile in the space of thirty seconds. It may
thus emerge out of obscurity as the driver turns his back to regain the waiting car,
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standard-like: He focuses on the particular, the specific, and the variegation
(which is why his recital of the possible factual transactions is appropriately
lengthy). His description effectively prepares the reader to conclude that
reasonable precaution by a driver at railroad crossing will require a number
of different behaviors depending on the disparate circumstances.
Notice what Holmes and Cardozo have done. Their pro-rule and prostandards positions, respectively, have already been prefigured at the level of
the evidentiary and operative facts. One might say that Holmes has a rulelike vision of railroad crossing accidents while Cardozo has a standard-like
vision. 142
All this is an extended illustration of recursivity in the context of rules
vs. standards. The appropriateness of rules and standards at railroad
crossings has already been prefigured in the description of the facts (the

and may then descend upon him suddenly when his car is on the track. Instead of
helping himself by getting out, he might do better to press forward with all his
faculties alert. So a train at a neighboring station, apparently at rest and harmless,
may be transformed in a few seconds into an instrument of destruction. At times
the course of safety may be different. One can figure to oneself a roadbed so level
and unbroken that getting out will be a gain. Even then the balance of advantage
depends on many circumstances and can be easily disturbed. Where was Pokora to
leave his truck after getting out to reconnoiter? If he was to leave it on the switch,
there was the possibility that the box cars would be shunted down upon him before
he could regain his seat. The defendant did not show whether there was a
locomotive at the forward end, or whether the cars were so few that a locomotive
could be seen. If he was to leave his vehicle near the curb, there was even stronger
reason to believe that the space to be covered in going back and forth would make
his observations worthless. One must remember that while the traveler turns his
eyes in one direction, a train or a loose engine may be approaching from the
other.
Illustrations such as these bear witness to the need for caution in framing standards
of behavior that amount to rules of law. The need is the more urgent when there is
no background of experience out of which the standards have emerged. They are
then, not the natural flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules
artificially developed, and imposed from without. Extraordinary situations may not
wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting for the commonplace or normal. In default of the guide of customary conduct, what is suitable for
the traveler caught in a mesh where the ordinary safeguards fail him is for the
judgment of ajury.
Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co, 292 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1934) (citations omitted).
142. They are not imagining the same crossings. Holmes is thinking about what the driver
knows. Cardozo is thinking about the variety of precautions that might be reasonable given the
wide array of different railroad crossing situations. And each of them is already thinking about
the operative facts, the context in a way which will lead, respectively, to a rule or a standard.
It is, of course, conceivable that the historical actuality was quite the reverse. Perhaps
Holmes was fixated on a rule and Cardozo on a standard and each read the facts, the context to
achieve their desired outcomes. Or perhaps each was thinking about the whole thing
dialectically.
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railroad crossing, the knowledge of the driver) and the transactional
143
challenge (the harmful train/automobile encounter).
The same sort of recursivity occurs with formalism vs. realism and its
other localized variants. The point is that any attempt to resolve the

formalism vs. realism dispute by references to the factual setting fails
inasmuch as we are caught in recursive circularity. Formalism turns out to be
appropriate in suitably characterized formalist circumstances. Realism turns
out to be appropriate in suitably characterized realist circumstances. This, of
course, is neither resolution nor explanation.
Recursivity gives the lie to a certain naive conception of the relation of
law and facts. In the naive legal consciousness, one "applies the law to the
facts" as if the apperception of the facts were independent of the law one is
ostensibly applying. Recursivity is the observation that the same or similar
forms that give shape to the law also give shape to the facts. To the extent
that both law and facts are constructed or apprehended through the same
form (e.g., ruleness or standardness), they will have a predictable tendency
to fit each other.
B.

SHALLOWNESS

Shallowness could be considered a kind of recursivity-except that
instead of pertaining to the law-situation relation, it pertains to the lawpurpose relation. This experience of shallowness can happen with some
frequency in the formalism vs. realism disputes.
An example: We say that formalism is good because it serves "rule-oflaw" virtues. At first impression the statement seems plausibly correct. But
then in the next moment, one realizes that this plausibility depends upon
the prior construction or apprehension of "rule-of-law virtues" within a
formalist aesthetic. In other words, one has already characterized the "ruleof-law virtues" in the image of formalism. Once this realization is had, the
sense of shallowness follows forthwith: Formalism is good because it serves
those legal virtues that are served by formalism. Uhmmm...
Or, take a realist view instead. Realism is good because it allows us to
take context into account. At first we agree. But then we realize that taking
context into account is precisely what we mean by realism. The experience
of shallowness follows immediately: Contextualism is good because it takes
context into account. Right...
This experience of shallowness is often presaged by the sense that a
given argument is little more than words being moved around the page
143. This is not to say that one couldn't get from Holmes's account of the facts to a
standard or from Cardozo's description of the facts to a rule. Logically, there is nothing that
would prevent such a result. But it's also beside the point here, which is simply that the appeal
of formalism/rules/textualism and realism/standards/contextualism is already anticipated and
prefigured (hence recursivity) in the description of the facts (the railroad crossing) and the
transactional dilemma (the train/car encounter).
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(without regard to their ostensible referents). One fails to notice
immediately the emptiness because the arguments arrive at the court (or in
the law-review office) with a seemingly more interesting explanatory or
normative structure-maybe a structure like the quote below. Indeed, read
the following passage, agree with its claims (you should), take note of its
modest heuristic value, and then experience the vacancy (i.e., rules are good
when rules are good). The quote:
Our approach here suggests that it is impossible to resolve this
dispute in the abstract. When predictability is especially important,
and where numerous decisions have to be made, the case for rulebound judgment is greatly strengthened. And when judges have
the information and the capacity to produce decent rules, they
have good reason to attempt to do exactly that. But if judges lack
that information and that capacity, they might reasonably limit
their decisions to particular facts for fear that broad decisions will
have unfortunate systematic effects and prove too crude to handle
situations not yet subject to briefing and argument. 144
And this contributes what to our knowledge, precisely? Rules are good when
judges have enough information to make good rules? And when judges lack
such good information, they should use standards?
C. INDIVIDUA TION

Like other academic commentary, this Article makes use of relatively
simple examples to make its points (e.g., the "stop, look, and listen" rule).
Other classic examples from the broader literature include "Do not go over
55 MPH," "Follow the plain meaning of the text," "No vehicles in the Park,"
(and so on).
The great virtue of such simple hypothetical examples is that they
readily illustrate the more theoretical points. But there is also a great vice.
That vice is that such simple hypotheticals institute an often unnoticed and
rather controversial assumption-call it atomism-that more complex
phenomena are simply more complicated and elaborate versions of the
simple ones. That is not obviously true-not of language, cognition, life, or,
as we shall see, law. 145
This brings us to individuation. The simple examples used in this article
and in others prefigure the formalism vs. realism disputes and their localized

144. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REv.
885, 948 (2003).
145. For a sophisticated elaboration of this point, see generally STEVEN WINTER, A
CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAw, LIFE, AND MIND (2001) (discussing the idea that reason is a
product of dynamic social values that contribute to law in concrete and predictable ways). In
the context of language and cognition, see generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH (1999).
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variants by identifying discrete and simple hypotheticals. Simplicity is nice
and all, and it certainly helps to make the points succinctly. But in the
context of law, it is not obvious that this sort of simplicity is a helpful starting
point. Consider, by way of example, the famous Hart-Fuller hypothetical of
an ordinance that prohibits vehicles in the park.' 46 Now, between Hart and
Fuller, the jurisprudential dispute focused in part on whether the term
"vehicle" had a core of settled meaning, standard instances (Hart's view), or
whether the ordinance had to be read as a whole in light of its purposes
(Fuller's view).

47
1

Framed this way, the dispute is jurisprudential in character. It is also
about the proper unit of interpretation. Are we talking about the meaning
of "vehicle" or of "No vehicles in the Park"? This is a matter of individuation.
But even this version of the dispute greatly simplifies the problem because,
offhand, our problem is to figure out what is the meaning of a directive that
proscribes (((((((((vehicles) in a park) in an ordinance) that is being
interpreted) presumably by a court) in a post WWII) Anglo-American
jurisprudential system) as imagined by a legal-scholar writing circa 1958) for
48
an American law review). 1
Taking this initially broad view of the Hart-Fuller interchange, the
question is: What is the proper object of our legal attention? Just what is it
that we are or should be interpreting here? 149 The answer-and here, it is
not meant to be helpful-is that the text might be cut off from its contexts at
any of the breakpoints marked by the parentheses above. 150 And the point is
that not only are these different texts, but being different texts, they have
different meanings and relate to their different contexts differently.
This, then, is the individuation problem. It is what belies the virtues of
so-called textualism. Indeed, the virtues commonly associated with
textualism-fixity, restraint, publicity-all founder when one realizes that
the simplicity of the injunction, "follow the plain meaning of the text,"
dissolves upon further inquiry. "Text?" "Which text?" "What are you talking
about?" 151

H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 607
146.
(1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REv.

630, 662 (1958).
147. Hart, supra note 146, at 593; Fuller, supranote 146, at 662.
148. Schlag, supra note 117, at 1688-92 (describing the institutional, practical, and
jurisprudential orientations of the judicial interpreter as she reads the constitutional text);
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 144, at 886 (emphasizing the importance of institutional
context in deciding upon an interpretive methodology).

149.

Notice that the object of attention has just been reduced to a text (a somewhat

narrower category).

150 .... and, of course, many more. Those parenthetical divisions are only my categories.
One could think of many other ways of slicing and dicing things up.
151. For an elaborate demonstration of the point, see Schlag, supra note 117, at 1683-86.
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The same is true of purposivism. The formulation of a plausible
purpose for a law depends crucially upon the individuation that creates the
law to be interpreted. For instance, the attribution of a purpose to the First
Amendment's protection of freedom of speech varies depending whether
freedom of speech is to be interpreted in light of the other First
Amendment freedoms, the entire Bill of Rights, or the political theories or
precepts informing the Constitution (and more). Purpose is a function, inter
alia, of individuation-in the same way that context is a function of text
(and vice versa). It follows then that since, in its interesting respects (an
important hedge) law's individuations are not fully formalized, the
ostensible virtues of purposivism (situatedness, context-bound meaning, and
reasonableness), founder on the vertiginous proliferation of possible
contexts. "Context?" "Which context?" "What are you talking about?"
The analysis above not only suggests that we need to pay attention to
the individuations we presuppose (collectively and individually), but it also
leads in a different, more disturbing direction-namely, whether
individuation is at all possible, or whether it is the equivalent of trying to
draw lines in a river.152 Thus, for instance, the primordial question to be
asked about textualism is not whether it is a good idea, but whether it is
153
possible or even intelligible.
D.

DISPLACEMENT

Discussions of formalism vs. realism disputes and localized variants
typically take place within highly abstract settings (law-review articles) and
with highly abstracted law-directives (hypotheticals such as "do not go faster
than safe" or "do not go above 55 MPH"). The abstraction typically results in
a kind of tunnel-vision perspective in which a localized subject is isolated
from the rest of the legal domain and the effects of the choice (e.g., formal
value vs. substantive value, rule vs. standard) beyond the isolated local
subject are overlooked. But we know, at least since Coase's path-breaking
article (and likely before), that the choice of a law-directive will have
54
systemic reverberations beyond the local situation isolated for analysis. 1
We might expect that the choice in favor of a substantive rule in a given
area will give rise to an attenuating standard at the evidentiary level.

152. For elaboration, see Schlag, Dedifferentiation,supra note 1, at 47.
153. Finding an appealing and yet faithful definition of textualism is no easy task. Consider
the definition below and note the way the last phrase effectively cannibalizes the meaning of the
first part of the sentence: "[T ] extualism does not admit of a simple definition, but in practice is
associated with the basic proposition that judges must seek and abide by the public meaning of
the enacted text, understood in context (as all texts must be)." John Manning, Textualism and
Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005).
154. This reflexive feedback-loop effect is a crucial part of Coase's attack on Pigouvian
externalities analysis. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1661
(1989); see id. (discussing Coase's article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)).
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Similarly, one might expect, for instance, the adoption of a substantive
standard to yield a rule-like delimitation of its operative scope.
We can formulate some rules of thumb here. Hence, rules in an isolated
local area can be expected to yield compensatory standards in the vicinity
(the displacement effect). Standards in an isolated local area will likely yield
compensatory rules in the vicinity (the displacement effect). One would
expect the displacement effect and the resulting compensation to occur
along some very traditional lines:
Burden of Persuasion
Delimitation of Operative Scope
Evidentiary Requirements
Implementing Procedural Mechanism
The key point here with the displacement effect is that when it
happens-and one expects it to happen some of the time-it vitiates the
ascription of the traditional virtues and vices to the localized variant pairs.
Why? Because the ostensible achievement of the classic virtues and vices
attached are effectively attenuated or even negated by the displacement
effect-the presence of compensatory directives.
This compensation can occur because a chosen approach (e.g., a
standard) produces the information leading to external attempts to
compensate for excess. 155 Or the compensation occurs because the decision
makers, ab initio, recognize the need for temporization. Either way, the
point remains that much of the classic vices and virtues assigned to the
formalist and realist strands in the disputes depend upon a certain tunnel
vision (one that is very much characteristic of the micro-perspective of
common-law thinking).
The upshot is that whether a directive, an interpretive approach, or a
value exhibits its characteristic virtues or vices depends not simply upon an
examination of that directive, interpretive approach, or value, but upon the
156
relevant juridical entourage in which it is nested.
E.

SUMMARY

Recursivity, shallowness, individuation, and displacement-these are
some of the main critical moves upon which the formalism vs. realism
disputes and their localized variants hinge. The deployment of these moves

155. SeeJason S. Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic Analysis of
Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 341, 361-62 (1991) (arguing that rules and standards tend over
time to produce information showing their inadequacy thus leading to their replacement by
their opposite).
156. Sunstein and Vermeule in this respect are quite right to focus attention on the
institutional context. Sunstein &Vermeule, supra note 144, at 866. Solum, in turn, is quite right
in pointing out that institutional context requires a focus on the virtues ofjudges and judging.
Solum, supra note 20, at 522-23.
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can effectively yield a breakdown in these disputes. Whether the moves will
seem rhetorically convincing in a given context, however, is a different
question.
VI. CONCLUSION

For the moment, it feels like the formalism vs. realism disputes are here
to stay. Some version or another of the disputes have been with us in more
or less attenuated forms for centuries-perhaps millennia. In American law,
we happen to be in a particular phase-one in which the disputes show all
the earmarks of being at once actively pursued, intensely overwrought, and
yet inconclusive.
The logics of collapse described here-recursivity, shallowness,
individuation, and displacement-help us move beyond this odd state of
affairs. They help show that the stylized disputes are not necessarily as
important as we think they are. Their attendant arguments are not nearly as
pressing or meaningful as they might first have seemed.
To put it in other words: It may well be that we cannot get beyond the
formalism vs. realism disputes in our positive law at this time. But this need
not dictate our orientation towards those disputes. What is appealing about
the critical moves is that they allow us to recognize that these disputes are in
ruins. We can then turn our attention (even if not our law) to other matters.
What is perhaps more important is recognizing that in the midst of
these disputes, it is the rhetorical work exposed by the critical movesrecursivity, shallowness, individuation, displacement, and, ultimately,
collapse-that matters. It is there that the crucial framing is accomplished.

